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ABSTRACT
The rapid expansion of franchising requires that the courts, and the law
in general, adapt to new circumstances, including the franchise parties’
rightful expectations. Franchisees and franchisors may not act in the spirit
of the contract, and the traditional approach under contract damages law
often fails to remedy that situation. For example, how can a franchisee or
franchisor recover in the event of actions that are not prohibited by the
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contract, but that nevertheless run counter to a party’s natural (and probable)
expectations? These and other issues are addressed in the context of a
“Fairness in Franchising” rule.
Currently, remedies for disgruntled parties to franchise agreements are
limited to those available for the breach of an express contract provision, and
they certainly do not allow for an award of punitive damages. However,
legal remedies for bad faith in franchising agreements already exist. For
example, at common law, tort damages may be awarded in a cause of action
for “bad faith.” The allowance of a tort cause of action for bad faith could
deter wrongful acts by parties inducing franchise purchases, by would-be
fraudsters (whether franchisors or franchisees) throughout the course of a
franchise relationship, and otherwise by free-riding franchisees or through
the opportunistic behaviors on the part of franchisors after an agreement has
been executed. A standard test for franchising good faith and fair dealing
will leave courts better able to not simply deal with bad acts, but also to
encourage the franchise parties’ appropriate and mutually beneficial actions
while they are reaching and then implementing their contracts.
Key Words/Phrases: Franchisors, Franchisees, Franchising, Contracts,
Good Faith, Fair Dealing, Special Relationships, Dependence, Business
Judgment Rule, Free-Riding, Contract Damages, Tortious Breach,
Commercial Settings, Legal Realism, Franchisee Protections
INTRODUCTION: GOOD FAITH, A PROBLEMATIC RULING, THE
COVENANT, AND A ROADMAP
Across the United States, courts do, in practice, consider whether to
apply “good faith”1 to franchising. We see this when courts decide for or
against claims that the franchisor should be held liable for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.2 In Canada, too, one sees
1. Immanuel Kant’s philosophies also contained an interpretation of the Golden Rule.
Robert Johnson & Adam Cureton, Kant’s Moral Philosophy, THE STAN. ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF
PHIL. (Feb. 23, 2004), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/ [https://perma.cc/D6X9EZYH].
2. See Seth William Goren, Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places: Problems in
Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith Performance, 37 U. S.F. L. REV. 257, 258–
60(2003) (arguing courts have made general pronouncements on the subject but have reversed
their own decisions because good faith has multiple definitions); Howard Hunter, The Implied
Obligation of Good Faith, in THE FUTURE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 6, 13 (Michael Furmston
eds., 2020) (citing Whited v. WestRock Servs., No. 3:17-CV-01341, Inc. 2018 WL 3416704
(M.D. Tenn. 2018), and concluding that “[m]ost American courts seem to be in agreement . . .
that the implied obligation of good faith does not create any new rights for the parties but
simply protects the reasonable expectations that each party has about the benefits to be derived
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the same approach,3 and the search for and possible application of a good
faith covenant can be found worldwide.4 The covenant is frequently
limited5—in effect, avoided— because courts cannot simply insert a “good
faith” provision into a contract.6 Nonetheless, while the implied covenant of
from the agreement”).
3. Brad Hanna & Mitch Koczerginski, Canada, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING
CAN/1, CAN/5 (Dennis Campbell eds., 2d ed. 2018) (referring to Ontario’s franchise
legislation which imposes a duty of fair dealing on both franchisors and franchisees). Similar
provisions are included in Canada’s other provinces as well. Franchises Act, R.S.N.B. 2014,
c 111, section 3(1) (Can.); Franchises Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c F-14.1, section 3(1); Franchises
Act, C.C.S.M 2012, c F-156, section 3(2); and S.B.C. Act 2015, c 35, section 3(1). Curiously,
however, New Brunswick is the only Canadian province not to impose a duty of fair dealing.
Richard R. Wozenilek, Canada, in INTERNATIONAL AGENCY AND DISTRIBUTION LAW CDN/1,
CDN/47 (Dennis Campbell eds., 2d ed. 2018). Although there is no uniform franchise
legislation in Canada, the statutes in each of the provinces are substantially similar. Hanna &
Koczerginski, Canada, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING,at CAN/1.
4. Good faith is applied to franchise contracts and the franchise relationship arising
therefrom, in the two main legal traditions, the common law and the Civil Law.
[I]n civil law jurisdictions, the duty to act in good faith appears to imply a positive
obligation to take affirmative steps to, inter alia, support franchisees throughout
the franchise relationship and be responsive to threats faced by the franchise
brand against competition. On the other hand, the common law duty of honest
performance, which originates from a general organizing principle of good faith,
seems to call for a negative obligation for franchisees to refrain from acting in a
capricious manner towards franchisees. Perhaps more importantly, while the
distinction between the application of the principle of good faith in these
diverging legal traditions may not always be described as simply, it is generally
accepted that the notion of good faith in civil law would impose more significant
expectations and obligations on a franchisor, and likely sooner, than would
similar concepts under common law.
Bruno Floriani, Marissa Carnevale & Tanya Nakhoul, Good Faith and International
Franchising, in LEXOLOGY GTDT’S PRACTICE GUIDE TO FRANCHISE, 2 (Philip F. Zeidman
eds., ed. 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=282330e2-8528-468d-a20f6f99e0de2031 [https://perma.cc/N9X3-QQ4A]. Incidentally, the United Kingdom appears to
be the only common law jurisdiction, with a few U.S. states, with no real protection under a
general duty of good faith in commercial contracts. Barri Mendelsohn, Jenny Willcock &
Cassandra Ditzel, KWM Full English: Implied Duties of Good Faith in the UK - When Do
They Apply?, KING & WOOD MALLESONS (May 1, 2020), https://www.kwm.com/en/uk/knowl
edge/insights/implied-duties-of-good-faith-when-do-they-apply-20200501 [https://perma.cc/
J5YZ-7YD8]. Sometimes there can be an implied duty of good faith if there is evidence of a
presumed intention by the parties and their contractual relationship. Id.
5. Goren, supra note 2, at 281.
6. Era Aviation Inc. v. Seekins, 973 P.2d 1137, 1141 (Alaska 1999) (“[T]he covenant is
implied to effectuate, not to alter, the reasonable expectations of the parties. . . .”) (emphasis
added); Hickcox-Huffan v. US Airways, Inc., 855 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting
that the covenant is to aid in the interpretation of a contract); Kropinak v. ARA Health
Services, 33 P.3d 679, 682 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (declining to apply an implied covenant to
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good faith and fair dealing “cannot replace the express provisions of a
franchise agreement, [it certainly] may shed light on the parties’ intentions
when there is no express provision.”7 In effect, the covenant “may serve as
the best method to measure contract performance in franchising.”8
Some courts have declined to infer a good faith and fair dealing
requirement into franchise agreements. For example, in the recent decision
of Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Clairday,9 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reaffirmed the idea of strict compliance to the terms within a franchiserelated option contract.10 The Court stated that, under Texas law, a franchise
developer cannot invoke equitable intervention as a means to evade the plain
terms of the agreement when the franchise developer attempted to exercise
a renewal option.11 The franchisee had a twenty-year agreement with the
franchisor for a Pizza Inn franchise.12 At the end of the twenty years, the
franchisee had the option to renew for two five-year terms if the franchisee
notified the franchisor of the franchisee’s intent to renew at least six months
before the current term expired.13 When the first renewal term expired, the
franchisor refused to grant the franchisee a second renewal because the
franchisee had been two months late in notifying the franchisor of his intent
to renew.14 Generally, in Texas, courts require strict compliance with option
contracts.15
The franchisee tried to argue for equitable intervention to allow the
franchisee to exercise the option to renew.16 Equitable intervention is an
exception to strict compliance, which is allowed when (1) the delay is slight,
(2) the optioner’s loss is small, and (3) failure to “grant relief would result in
such hardship . . . as to make it unconscionable to enforce literally the
good faith and fair dealing to override express provisions addressed in a written contract).
7. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation: A Two-Standard Approach,
2013 MICH. STATE L. REV. 641, 648 (2013).
8. Id. at 648–49. See Carmen D. Caruso, Franchising’s Enlightened Compromise: The
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 26 FRANCHISE L.J. 207, 207 (2007) (“[I]t
remains impossible to define the parties’ mutual rights and responsibilities so precisely that
every future question is decided in advance, when the agreement is signed”. Therefore, the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is, for resolving franchising contract
controversies, “an unhappy but enlightened compromise” better than “everything else that has
been, or could be, tried.” Id.).
9. Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Clairday, 979 F.3d 1064 (5th Cir. 2020).
10. Id. at 1066–67.
11. Id. at 1066 & 1069.
12. Id. at 1066.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1065–66.
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condition precedent.”17 Equitable intervention, however, has only been
applied to lease agreements in the past.18 The franchisee had argued that not
allowing him to renew his option contract would be a hardship because (1)
the franchisee would partially forfeit the $1,250,000 initial investment to
become an area developer, (2) there would be a forfeit of future profits, and
(3) the franchise location would close.19 The court found that the reasons
given by the franchisee did not meet the hardship prong because they did not
lead to a forfeiture.20 The court reasoned that when the option expired the
franchisee had received everything he had bargained for, that future profits
were not an unconscionable hardship except for extreme cases, and that the
franchise store closure was not an unconscionable hardship.21
The decision in Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Clairday overlooks the nature of the
franchise relationship and focuses exclusively on unconscionability as a
reason to not apply strict compliance.22 However, why must equity be bound
by (i.e., limited to) unconscionability? One could argue that, in applying the
doctrine of unconscionability to the facts, a court should still account for the
magnitude of harm and whether the parties acted in good faith. The renewal
option in this case was not a naked option but was inextricably linked to the
underlying franchise development agreement. Additionally, it is clear that
the two agreements in Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Clairday (the development
agreement and the renewal agreement/provision) should have been read
together. Then, the court could have easily concluded that the developer
suffered a forfeiture: the developer paid his initial $1,250,000 fee, which
could be seen as including the discounted future value of the renewal options.
If the optionee had paid this amount over time, not upfront as a fixed fee,
would paying a much smaller amount – e.g., $200,000 one year before the
expiration – have sufficed? Apparently, this was not an issue for the court,
with its narrow view of matters involving franchising; the court’s turning
toward good faith could have been a move towards justice. We will now
consider this concept further, as we examine the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
The covenant itself is the expectation that the parties will adhere to
“community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness” and refrain
17. Jones v. Gibbs, 130 S.W.2d 265, 272 (Tex. 1939).
18. Pizza Inn, Inc., 979 F.3d. at 1067 & 1067 n.2.
19. Id. at 1068.
20. Id. at 1069.
21. Id.
22. The court also fails to recognize, for example, the potential answers to derive from
concepts, provisions, or principles in the Uniform Commercial Code or the Second
Restatement of Contracts.

416

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24:2

from interfering with the contractual rights of the other party or parties.23 Put
another way, the covenant prohibits actions that destroy, injure, or limit a
party’s right or ability to receive the expected benefits of the contract.24 As
23. Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 922 A.2d 710, 722 (N.J. 2006). See WSC/2005 LLC
v. Trio Ventures Associates, No. 414402V, 2018 WL 3629441, at *9 (Md. 2018) (stating that
a plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a contractual obligation and the defendant
breached that obligation to prove breach).
24. See In re Magna Cum Latte, Inc., Bankruptcy No. 07-31814, 2007 WL 4412143, at
*3, 4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (noting, “[i]f a contract gives a party discretion to act, rather
than expressly allowing or disallowing action, the implied contract applies,” and thereby
holding that the franchisor of coffeehouse franchises breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing owed to franchisee Magna Cum Latte; further stating that breach of the
covenant
requires more than mere negligent or mistaken conduct. . . . [It] requires ‘a failure
or refusal to discharge contractual responsibilities, prompted not by an honest
mistake, bad judgment or negligence but rather by a conscious and deliberate act,
which unfairly frustrates the agreed common purposes and disappoints the
reasonable expectations of the other party thereby depriving that party of the
benefits of the agreement’
(citations omitted)); Interim Health Care of N. Illinois, Inc. v. Interim Health Care, Inc., 225
F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 2000) (overturning the trial court’s summary judgment for the
defendant franchisor, and noting that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires the
franchisor, “[w]hen . . . vested with contractual discretion, [to] exercise that discretion
reasonably and with proper motive, and may not do so arbitrarily, capriciously or in a manner
inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties”).
Although the approach of common law courts to the duty of good faith in
franchise agreements has been inconsistent at times, the content of the duty of
good faith in the franchise context may be summarised as follows:
• the franchisor must exercise its powers under the franchise agreement in good
faith and with due regard to the interests of the franchisee;
• the franchisor must observe standards of ‘honesty, fairness and reasonableness’
and take into account the interests of its franchisees;
• the parties must not act in such a way that ‘eviscerates or defeats the objectives
of the agreement’ or ‘destroys the rights of the franchisee to enjoy the fruits of
the contract’;
• neither party must substantially reduce the benefit of the bargain for the other,
or cause significant harm to the other, in a manner contrary to the original
intention and expectation of the parties; and
• where the franchisor is given discretion under the franchise agreement, it must
be exercised reasonably and with proper justification, and may not be done
subjectively, capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable
expectations of the parties.
Floriani, Carnevale & Nakhoul, supra note 4, at 6–7.
The duty of good faith and fair dealing may be positive - requiring that “parties honestly and
reasonably carry out their contractual obligations.” Days Inn Worldwide, Inc. v. Sai Baba,
Inc. 300 F. Supp. 2d 583, 590 (S.D. Ohio 2004). Or it may be negative - forbidding parties to
take any action that would “destroy[] or injur[e] the right of the other party to receive the
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business deals unfold, uncertainty and complexity may reign, leaving any
application of a broad-minded “Golden Rule” for franchise parties25
extremely difficult as doing so requires the determination of community
standards for a specific set of facts. Business lawsuits, for example, raise
questions as to what “decency”26 is and at what point the parties are
interfering with each other’s contractual rights. Thus, the term “good faith”
has no precise meaning because it is subject to court interpretation on a caseby-case basis.27
Still, while the subject, good faith, may seem ephemeral, there are a
number of principles and improvements that can be pursued. The Article
first considers the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and how a party
harmed by the covenant’s breach may need more than simply contract
damages, which are insufficient to cover all the harms incurred. The
following section, Part II of the Article, reviews special consumer or
business relationships and the covenant, while Part III looks to franchising
and the available damages for a breach of the covenant, usually just contractrelated awards. The following Parts, IV and V, deal with special
relationships, tortious breach, franchisee dependence, the unusual
commercial settings for franchisees, and the potential for expanding the
reach of good faith and fair dealing claims. The Article then proceeds to
major concerns such as fighting franchisee free-riding while also working to
facilitate franchisee protections. It concludes with information about
comparable franchisee protections abroad that may serve to model
improvements in the U.S. law on good faith in franchising. Standards for
good faith and fair dealing, with both prohibitions and perhaps safe harbors,
may enable courts to foster appropriate conduct and deter franchisor
opportunism.
I.

INSUFFICIENCY OF CONTRACT DAMAGES
In the event of a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair

fruits of the contract” Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y.
1933).
25. In effect, franchisor X and franchisee Y would be expected to do for the other party
(X’s franchisee or Y’s franchisor, respectively) as X or Y would have its contracting party
(X’s franchisee or Y’s franchisor) do in return.
26. Arnold v. Nat’l Cty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (discussing
whether the insurer acted reasonably when failing to settle a claim).
27. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Terminations: “Good Cause” Decoded, 51 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 103, 116 (2016).
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dealing, the non-breaching party should receive contract damages.28 The
purpose of damages is to assist the non-breaching party in recovering any
financial losses or injuries that the party suffered because of the breach.29
The non-breaching party is normally entitled to (1) compensatory or
liquidated damages, or (2) specific performance.30
In the franchise context, an award of contract-related damages may
be insufficient. In California, for instance, the amount of damages for a
breach of the implied covenant in the employment context is limited to actual
damages caused by the breach.31 Specific examples include the value of the
loss of compensation and the benefits and financial damage that may result
from a franchisee’s or a franchisor’s breach.32 More generally, it is the total
loss in value, any incidental or consequential damages, and any cost or loss
that the non-breaching party avoided by not having to perform.33
Franchisees typically face severe challenges trying to prove
damages that are “certain.” For example, in the event of a territorial
encroachment34 how could a franchisee demonstrate that a loss of revenue
stemmed specifically from the actions of its franchisor? Indeed, a franchise’s
failure can result from cultural changes, population differences, or the
existence of competition.35 To show lost revenue, franchisees ordinarily
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
29. ROBERT W. EMERSON, BUSINESS LAW 166 (6th ed. 2015); Francis G.X. Pileggi,
Primer on Contract Damages and Options for Non-Breaching Party, LEXIS NEXIS 1 (Feb. 13,
2013), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/corporate/b/blog/posts/primer-on-contrac
t-damages-and-options-for-non-breaching-party [https://perma.cc/9Q94-9WEZ].
30. Emerson, supra note 29, at 167–72; see also Bigda v. Fischbach Corp., 898 F. Supp.
1004, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that the non-breaching party, the plaintiff, elected not
to seek liquidated damages).
31. Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2020) No. 2423.
32. Id.
33. Bethany Appleby & Jim Meaney, Show Me The Money! Maximizing Monetary
Recovery in Franchise Cases, ABA 39TH F. ON FRANCHISING 2 (Nov. 2–4, 2016), https://w
ww.wiggin.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/show20me20the20money20maximizing20mo
netary20recovery20in20franchise20cases20aba2039th20annual20forum20on20franchising2
0appleby20nov202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLQ4-WB98] (relying upon the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts).
34. See generally Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 191
(2010) (reviewing one of the most significant issues in franchising, franchisors’ encroachment
upon existing franchisees’ markets, such as by granting new franchises or building franchisorowned units near those existing franchises, or perhaps through direct competition with
franchisees by, for example, direct sales online; recommending a series of actions to rectify
encroachment problems, and concluding that franchisees be accorded some protections
comparable to that of employees if they are not given any market/territorial protection).
35. Jason Gehrke, 10 Reasons Why Franchisees Fail, FRANCHISE ADVISORY CTR. (Feb.
14, 2016), https://www.franchiseadvice.com.au/10-reasons-why-franchisees-fail/ [https://pe
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must provide business records or expert testimony establishing a “reasonably
accurate” amount.36 However, when a franchisee has yet to operate for a
sufficient length of time, providing enough evidence to create a reasonable
estimate of revenue losses may not be possible. Additionally, franchisees
often cannot assert a quantifiable experience value to their franchise.
One issue, in particular, is the valuation of any goodwill the
franchisee may have generated.37 Goodwill is the loyalty and reputation that
a business has developed and which goes to the benefit of the franchise name
and, more generally, the franchisor.38 There are no set ways to calculate
goodwill,39 and the franchisor normally retains ownership of any goodwill
rma.cc/AB2E-3J5A] (providing “‘franchisee causes” for failure).
36. Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 WL 440709, at *5 (Super. Ct. N.C. 2013)
(stating that corporations are allowed to recover lost profits due to a defendant’s wrongful
conduct as long as they can be proven with reasonable certainty); Safeco Ins. Co. of America
v. S & T Bank, No. 07-01086, 2010 WL 786257, at *10 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (requiring
“reasonably accurate evidence” to support the damages claim when using the Total Cost
Method); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 945 (6th Cir. 2005)
(using a reasonably accurate standard for experts); Cell, Inc. v. Ranson Investors, 427 S.E.2d
447, 448 (W. Va. 1992) (allowing the recovering of lost revenues where they are shown to be
reasonably accurate).
37. Goodwill is the intangible asset that includes a company’s reputation, local impact,
and other factors. It is used to evaluate the company. Goodwill, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014). See Clemense Ehoff, Jr. & Marvin L. Bouillon, Accounting for Goodwill:
Still Crazy After All these Years, 20 J. ACCOUNTING, ETHICS & PUB. POLICY 411, 413-414
(2019) (stating that “goodwill is the result of earnings or the expectation of them, and its value
fluctuates as earnings expectations vary. Changes in the value of goodwill cannot be
associated with the revenue of any period nor can they be assigned to a period on a rational
systematic basis”) (citing G.R. CATLETT & N.O. OLSON, N. O., ACCOUNTING FOR GOODWILL
85 (Accounting Research Study 10) (1968)); DONALD E. KIESO, JERRY J. WEYGANDT & TERRY
D. WARFIELD, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING, ch. 12, p. 11-12 (17th ed. 2019) (concluding,
"[g]oodwill is measured as the excess of the cost of the purchase over the fair value of the
identifiable net assets (assets less liabilities) purchased"; when defining purchased goodwill,
stating, “goodwill is recorded only when an entire business is purchased. [The difference
between] the fair value of the net tangible and identifiable intangible assets with the purchase
price of the acquired business . . . is considered goodwill[,] the excess cost over fair value of
the identifiable net assets acquired.”); KIESO, WEYGANDT & WARFIELD, supra, at ch. 12, p. 10
(declaring, “[c]onceptually, goodwill represents the future economic benefits arising from the
other assets acquired in a business combination that are not individually identified and
separately recognized”); C. WILLIAM THOMAS, WENDY M. TIETZ & WALTER T. HARRISON JR.,
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 823 (7th ed. 2019) (stating that goodwill is "[t]he excess cost of an
acquired company over the sum of the market values of its net assets (assets minus
liabilities)").
38. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Goodwill: Take a Sad Song and Make it Better, 46
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 349, 352 (2013).
39. Robert W. Emerson, Thanks for the Memories: Compensating Franchisee Goodwill
after Franchise Termination, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285, 337 (2018) (arguing for the
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through the franchise agreement itself.40 This poses an interesting question:
If the franchisor breaches the franchise agreement, is the franchisee’s claim
to any generated goodwill thereby strengthened?41
The foreseeability requirement, insofar as it restricts the award of
compensatory42 or consequential damages,43 may also present a high barrier
for the injured franchisee to overcome.44 In this instance, the franchisee is
required to show that the franchisor could have foreseen that the damages
would occur because of the breach.45 Generally, predicting a breach of
contract is difficult, even if one could foresee and thereby calculate the
damages that would follow such a breach.
Lastly, the franchisee must mitigate any damages that arise after a
breach has occurred. This could create an obstacle because of franchise
agreement terms. A franchisor may require that the franchisee return
property or dispose of the property in a certain way.46 Additionally, there are
certain investments that a franchisee makes for the purpose of a franchise
agreement that the franchisee cannot use in any other context. Each of these
hypothetical requirements may reduce the franchisee’s ability to recoup its
investment.
Other forms of damages, such as liquidated damages47 or specific
establishment of a framework to pay for franchisee-created goodwill when a franchise ends).
40. Maurice Roussety, Lorelle Frazer & Evan Douglas, Goodwill in Franchising - A
Precursory Examination, RESEARCHGATE (Dec. 2014), https://www.researchgate.net/pub
lication/280054412_Goodwill_in_franchising-A_precursory_examination [https://perma.cc/
77FL-3EST] (“[T]here is no established methodology to identify and value such goodwill.”).
41. See Kerry L. Bundy & Robert M. Einhorn, Franchise Relationship Laws, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING 183, 216 (Rupert M. Barkoff et al. eds., 4th ed. 2015)
(stating various state laws in which a franchiser may be found liable for damages of goodwill
to the franchisee).
42. Compensatory damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10TH ed. 2014) (Compensatory
damages are “[d]amages sufficient in amount to indemnify the injured person for the loss
suffered”).
43. Id. (defining consequential damages as “[l]osses that do not flow directly and
immediately from an injurious act but that result indirectly from the act”).
44. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 519 (Hornbook Series, 7th ed. 2014).
45. Id.
46. Emerson, supra note 7, at 693 app. § C(9)(c) (review of 100 franchise contracts in
1993 and in 2013 showed that in 78% and 81%, respectively, terminated franchisees were
required to return to the franchisor all trademarked supplies, signs, stationery, forms, and other
materials; id. at 694 app. § C(9)(d) (finding that 55% of surveyed franchise contracts provided
that all franchisee concepts become the franchisor’s exclusive property, dramatically up from
just 3% in 1993).
47. Contracting parties may specify in their agreement a specific amount due to the
nonbreaching party if the other party breaches. These are known as stipulated damages or,
more commonly, liquidated damages. See Liquidated damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
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performance, are equally unlikely to be fruitful for an injured franchisee.48
This is because franchisees have notoriously inferior bargaining power49 and
will not likely be able to convince a franchisor to add a provision that
provides for liquidated damages in the event the franchisor breaches its
obligations.50 Indeed, the franchisor may simply dictate the terms of the
franchise agreement.51 This pro-franchisor power disparity emanates from
law upholding franchisors’ contractual rights and from industry practice (a
franchisor’s knowledge of the franchisee’s business)52 as well as the
franchisee’s dependent state, along with economic and educational
imbalances.53 Many franchisees do not even have legal counsel advising
them about contract terms perhaps available to them, let alone negotiating
on their behalf.54
The current judicial approach—supportive of franchisor-dictated

473 (10th ed. 2014) (stating that liquidated damages constitute “[a]n amount contractually
stipulated as a reasonable estimation of actual damages to be recovered by one party if the
other party breaches”; further noting that a proper liquidated damages clause means that the
fixed sum in the contract “is the measure of damages for a breach, whether it exceeds or falls
short of the actual damages”).
48. The threshold to receive specific performance is high because courts tend to prefer
monetary damages instead of forcing the defendant to perform a certain action. Some of the
common reasons courts put forth for this preference are the high cost of monitoring a
defendant and the desire to avoid involuntary servitude. EMERSON, supra note 29, at 172; see
also Robert L. Ebe, David L. Steinberg & Brett R. Waxdeck, Radisson And The Potential
Demise Of The Sealy-Barnes-Hinton Rule, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 5–7 (2007) (discussing the
negative effect liquidated damages can impose on the franchisee).
49. Peter C. Lagarias & Robert S. Boulter, The Modern Reality of the Controlling
Franchisor: The Case for More, Not Less, Franchisee Protections, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 139,
141 (2010) (referring to opportunistic franchisor behavior through territorial encroachment,
enforcement of contract clauses, and franchise nonrenewal or termination).
50. But see Appleby & Meaney, supra note 33, at 13 (providing a discussion of
liquidation clauses in franchise agreements). Some franchise agreements provide for
liquidation damages for lost royalties owed to the franchisor if the franchisee breaches the
franchise agreement. Appleby & Meaney, supra note 33.
51. Jiri Jaeger & Frederik Born, Franchisees as Consumers, 5 FRANCHISE L. REV. 101,
101 (2018).
52. Jenny Buchan & Courtenay Atwell, Does Mandatory Pre-Contract Disclosure
Regulate Business Format Franchising Sufficiently or Do Franchisees Still Have to Rely on
the Kindness of Strangers: An Australian Perspective 28 (June 6–9, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
53. U.N. ESCOR, at I.1, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1999/7 (July 26, 1999).
54. See Robert W. Emerson, Fortune Favors the Franchisor: Survey and Analysis of the
Franchisee’s Decision Whether to Hire Counsel, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 709, 719 (2014)
(restating the comments of franchise attorneys, reporting on a survey of franchise lawyers,
and otherwise noting that studies show that franchisees visit their family lawyer or a friend
for counsel instead of obtaining advice from an attorney skilled in franchise matters).
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terms (even, for example, liquidated damages that only apply in favor of the
franchisor55)—only exacerbates the imbalance in bargaining power. On the
other hand, since there are mechanisms for calculating a liquidated amount
for a breach, franchisees should also be able to take advantage of a damages
calculation method in order to determine their rightful award if the franchisor
breaches the franchise agreement.56 With possible contract awards being
insufficient for a harmed franchisee, the courts should provide a more
expansive set of remedies.57
A philosophical precept of robust, mutually reinforcing duties can
be the basis for protecting franchisees and, in turn, strengthening the
franchise relationship. Promoting system-wide uniformity nurtures sales.58
Franchisees are willing to pay for a franchisor’s market brand that brings to
the franchisee customers who would otherwise not come to a non-brand
business offering the same or similar fare.59 Franchisors charge for that
brand, in terms of fees and royalties, while maintaining sufficient controls to
maintain strong trademarks and to prevent franchisee free-riding.60

55. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
56. In a related area, there are proposals to calculate franchise royalties more efficiently
and fairly. Robert W. Emerson & Charlie C. Carrington, Devising a Royalty Structure that
Fairly Compensates a Franchisee for Its Contribution to Franchise Goodwill, 14 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 279, 289–95 (2020).
57. Unlike in the United States, Australia’s Competition and Consumer Act allows for
private rights of action for a party to recover losses or damages. Robert W.
Emerson, Franchisees As Consumers: The South African Example, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
455, 493 (2014) (citing to Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VI s 82(1) (Austl.)).
58. Uniformity typically goes to the heat of franchise viability. Susser v. Carvel Corp.,
206 F. Supp. 636, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff’d, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964) (“It is this
uniformity of product and control of its quality and distribution which causes the public to
turn to franchise stores for the product.”); DLA PIPER U.S. LLC, EXPANDING A BUSINESS BY
FRANCHISING 162 (2007).
59. W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE & DISTRIBUTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:3 (2019);
Thomas J. Chinonis, Implied Covenant of Good Faith: A Two-Way Street in Franchising, 11
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 229, 238 (1998) (“Even inexperienced franchisees benefit from the
franchisor’s support and economic advantage that results from operating an established
system.”); Emerson, supra note 38, at 353 (referring to the concept as “good will”).
60. See Uri Benoliel, The Expectation of Continuity Effect and Franchise Termination
Laws: A Behavioral Perspective, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 139, 144 (2009) (“Individual franchisees
have an incentive to cut costs and supply low-quality products and services because they do
not bear the full cost of any resulting deterioration in the trademark’s value.”); Tyler Jones,
Keeping the Entire Pie and the Dog Fed: Why the Modern Instrumentality Test Fails to Reflect
the Realities of the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 36 FRANCHISE L.J. 341, 341 (2016)
(arguing the control franchisors have is only to protect their brand or intellectual property).
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SPECIAL CONSUMER OR BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicitly
requires all involved parties to behave in such a way that every party may
fully benefit from the terms of an agreement.61 In more elaborate language,
one American court ruled that “a party vested with contractual discretion
must exercise that discretion reasonably and with proper motive, and may
not do so arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with the
reasonable expectations of the parties.”62 The requirement is imposed either
by statute63 or by common law.64 Any action contrary to this requirement is
traditionally viewed as a breach of an implied contract.65 While some judges
have taken the stance that the implied covenant cannot be used to insert
contract terms which could have been obtained through negotiation,66 and
courts certainly have demonstrated great reluctance to let the implied
covenant somehow supersede contractual provisions,67 that reluctance
should not be overemphasized.68 Despite its opposition, the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be invaluable to protecting the
61. Covenant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 443 (10th ed. 2014) (definition in the subtopic,
“implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing”).
62. Burger King v. Agad, 941 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
63. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1566 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-1-304 (2018); FLA.
STAT. § 671.203 (2018); IOWA CODE ANN. §554.1304 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
106, §1-304 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-1-211 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 650.245
(2018).
64. Lelio v. Marsh USA, Inc., No. 15-10335-MLW, 2017 WL 3494214, at *10 (D. Ma.
2017) (referring to a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim as a “Fortune”
claim (citing Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977))).
65. In re Magna Cum Latte, Inc., No. 07-03304, 2007 WL 4412143, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Dec. 13, 2007) (“[T]he implied covenant informs the contractual language so that it
conforms to what the parties, bounded by norms of good faith and fair-dealing,
contemplated.”).
66. Oxbow Carbon & Mineral Holdings, Inc. v. Crestview-Oxbox Acquisition, LLC, No.
536, 2018, 2019 WL 237360, *17–18 (Del. 2019).
67. Jeffrey C. Selman, Applying the Business Judgment Rule to the Franchise
Relationship, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 111, 111 (2000).
Because reasonable expectations arise not only from express
terms, but also
from implied terms and the context in which the contract is made, limitations on
good faith that give excessive deference to express terms are incorrect. The
obligation of good faith rests on reasonable expectations that can create duties
that go beyond those specified in the express terms of the contract, including
duties that limit a party’s ability to exercise rights apparently created by the
express terms. Even a narrow view of the content of the good faith obligation . . .
recognizes this possibility.
Jay M. Feinman, Good Faith and Reasonable Expectations, 67 ARK. L. REV. 525, 558 (2014).
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franchisee from an arbitrary, callous, or even spiteful franchisor.69
Enforcing laws to ensure good faith and fair dealings of franchisors
is crucial to the health of a franchisee. It is not prohibited for franchisors to
deal in ways that best suit their business, but they are held to a certain
standard – that is, to exhibit candor and engage in good faith when
negotiating with franchisees.70 Franchisors in the United States should
understand that misrepresenting pertinent information in pre-contractual
negotiations and even lack of certain details required by disclosures deserve
serious consequences and will not be tolerated in franchise dealings.71
Honesty from a franchisor will not only build trust between itself and its
franchisee but also likely facilitate the advancement of mutual interests.
III.

FRANCHISE PARTIES ON THEIR BEST BEHAVIOR

In the context of franchising, for courts to apply a meaningful,
although limited, covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be
impractical.72
In contract law generally and franchise agreements
particularly, states have employed multiple approaches to enforce implied
covenants:73 typically, the franchisor is still obliged to perform in good faith
despite a contract clause reserving sole discretion to the franchisor.74 Florida,
69. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice has held that in determining whether a
franchisor has acted in good faith, the relevant test is to look to the franchisor’s conduct as a
whole in the context of the franchise agreement. Hanna & Koczerginski, supra note 3, at
CAN/7 (citing Fairview Donut Inc. v. The TDL Group Corp., aff’d 2012 ONSC 1252, leave
to appeal refused 2012 ONCA 867).
70. See FTC Franchise Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(a)–(w) (2019) (requiring disclosure of
certain information in the Federal Disclosure Document); Andrew Elmore, Franchise
Regulation for the Fissured Economy, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 907, 949 (2018) (recognizing
a prohibition with respect to “deceptive business conduct”). Note that the FTC Franchise Rule
does not provide a private cause of action. JTH Tax, Inc. v. Hines, No. 2:15cv558, 2017 WL
9772103, at *5 (E.D. Va. Dec. 15, 2017). For a list of prohibited practices, see 16 C.F.R. §
436.9 (2019).
71. Joel R. Buckberg & Jillian M. Suwanski, Disclosure Law Violations: Understanding
the Penalties, INT’L FRANCHISE ASS’N (Aug. 2008), https://web.archive.org/web/2018010403
0822/https://www.franchise.org/disclosure-law-violations-understanding-the-penalties [https
://perma.cc/L97E-ACNV].
72. Jeffery C. Selman, Applying the Business Judgment Rule to the Franchise
Relationship, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 111, 111 (2000) (noting that courts are reluctant to allow the
covenant to impact the franchise relationship).
73. Mark Dady, Sole Discretion: So What? Good Faith Still Can Prevail, 19 FRANCHISE
LAWYER 7, 7 (2016).
74. Dady, supra note 73, at 7–8; see Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 286 n.2
(2014) (invoking Minnesota law and suggesting that the law of many states—Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, and Wyoming—as well as
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for example, recognizes the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.75
The covenant “is intended to protect the reasonable expectations of the
contracting parties in light of their express agreement.”76 Good faith
performance is important to uphold a franchisor’s legal obligation and
encourage its future business, but a few states have allowed franchisors the
“sole discretion” to negate what was presumed to be a franchisor’s implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.77 Indeed, any use of discretion
“should be consistent with the overall purpose of the agreement and not
arbitrary, capricious or unduly surprising.”78
the District of Columbia “preclude[s] a party from waiving the obligations of good faith and
fair dealing”). Some courts holding that the good faith and fair dealing implied covenant is
not eliminated by a “sole discretion of the franchisor” provision are: Gen. Motors Corp. v.
New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 2001); Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727
F.2d 1145, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557
F.2d 918, 924 (2d Cir. 1977); Quiznos Franchising II, LLC v. Zigzag Rest. Grp., Bus. Fran.
Guide (CCH) ¶ 14,046 (D. Colo. Dec. 31, 2008); White Stone Partners, LP v. Piper Jaffray
Cos. Inc., 978 F. Supp. 878, 882 (D. Minn. 1997); Burger King Corp. v. Austin, 805 F. Supp.
1007, 1016–17 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1127 (N.J.
2001). See Carvel Corp. v. Diversified Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 930 F.2d 228, 231–32 (2d Cir. 1991)
(reviewing a distribution agreement—something comparable to a franchise contract—and
holding that “[w]hile the distributorship agreement gave Carvel considerable discretion with
regard to advertising, store location, wholesale sales, and other matters, this did not relieve
Carvel of its duty to act in good faith”). In Carvel Corp., the distributor-franchisee alleged
that Carvel’s bad faith actions included the following: “[1] rejection of proposed store
locations and franchisees, [2] refusal to allow changes in store blueprints to accommodate
[state] Health Department requirements, and [3] abrupt and unexplained decisions to reverse
wholesale sales and advertising policies.” Id.
75. Underwater Eng’g Servs., Inc. v. Util. Bd. of Key West, 194 So. 3d 437, 444–45 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
76. Id. at 445 (internal punctuation omitted).
77. DavCo Acquisition Holding, Inc. v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-1064, 2008 WL
755283, at *13–14 (S.D. Ohio 2008); Johnson v. Arby’s Inc., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) ¶
12,018, at 6 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2000); Patel v. Dunkin’ Donuts of Am., Inc., 496 N.E.2d
1159, 1159 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986); Yamin v. Moe’s Sw. Grill, LLC, 85 A.D.3d 1381, 1383–84
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011). In Miller v. KFC Corp., No. 3:99-CV-1566-D, 2001 WL 585763, at
*6–7 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2001), the court simply noted that, for franchise agreements, Texas
generally does not recognize the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See
Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 286 n.2 (2014) (mentioning that three states—
California, Idaho, and Wisconsin—might authorize parties to use careful contractual drafting
(“express provisions of the contract”) to eliminate the implied covenant).
78. Hunter, supra note 2, at 2.16 (citing, as an example, Lath v BMS Cat, No. 16-cv-534LM, 2018 WL 1835966 (D.N.H. 2018)). This does run counter to the great latitude given for
a franchisor’s “discretion” in overseeing the franchise system, as specified in the franchise
agreements and disclosed in the Franchise Disclosure Documents (FDDs). The author’s
review of 500 FDDs from the year 2020—covering all industries (including lodging,
restaurants, services, education, exercise, and other fields), all regions, and close to one-sixth
of all extant U.S. franchise systems—found that the vast majority of them (462) had clauses
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Compensation in these disputes is normally limited to contractrelated damages.79 However, there are some instances where contract
damages for breach of implied covenants are insufficient.80 In these cases,
franchisors may decide to litigate because there is no risk of accruing
additional—in this case, punitive—damages.81 If the franchisor is able to
exert unlimited discretion without any repercussions, the franchisee is at a
disadvantage before the agreement even begins.82 This imbalance often
occurs when franchisors execute the franchise agreement. For instance, if
the franchise is nationally known and possesses a variety of franchisees,
ranging from sophisticated to novice, the franchisor may fail to enforce the
agreement equally among the franchisees.83
To counter the stark “sole discretion”84 franchisor defense, a franchisee
would use the numerous cases, including those outside of franchise litigation,
in which there are narrow interpretations of this defense. Consider Miller v.
HCP Trumpet Investments, LLC.85 The plaintiff, Christopher Miller,
asserted that the defendant trustee board of a limited liability company
(Trumpet), co-founded by Miller, violated the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.86 Miller contended that the board had to conduct a Revlontype or “open-market” sale process before selling the LLC under the

specifically acknowledging the franchisor’s right to exercise broad discretion and that this
alone would not breach an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
79. Johansen v. Cal. State Auto. Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1975).
80. J. Kokolakis Contracting Corp. v. Evolution Piping Corp., 988 N.Y.S.2d 788, 793–
94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (stating that claims seeking damages for breach of covenant of good
faith and fair dealing could not also be brought with claim for breach of contract).
81. Note that in the event of frivolous litigation, the attorney may be subject to
punishment. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.1(AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983). So, while not a
direct risk to the corporation, the attorney may have some objections against a frivolous
action.
82. It is arguable that the franchisee is aware and accepts the disadvantage. After all, the
franchise process involves discussions and plenty of disclosures.
83. Stephanie Russ & Laura Kupish, It’s My Franchise Agreement, I’ll Enforce it
However I Want to – Maybe You Will, Maybe You Won’t, 37 FRANCHISE L.J. 589, 589 (2018).
But see id. (stating that inconsistent enforcement can lead to discrimination claims).
84. The Canadian approach to absolute discretion provides respite to the franchisee. The
franchisor must act reasonably in exercising its discretion honestly and in good faith.
Discretion must be exercised with a proper motive and not arbitrarily or capriciously. See
Sally L. Dahlstrom et al., W-7 The Evolution of Litigating Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Claims, Am. Bar Ass’n 43rd Annual Forum on Franchising 12 (October 2020).
85. Miller v. HCP Trumpet Investments, LLC, No. 107, 2018 WL 4600818 (Del. Sept.
20, 2018), available at https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2018/107-2018.h
tml [https://perma.cc/5Z3C-B7VB].
86. Id. at 1–2.
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covenant.87 Though the Miller court found Miller’s contention to be without
merit, it held that “the mere vesting of ‘sole discretion’ did not relieve the
Board of its obligation to use that discretion consistently with the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”88
The franchise agreement does not lay out everything that is to occur
during the franchise relationship. Franchisors and franchisees have
expectations that may not be expressed in the written franchise agreement—
expectations encompassed within an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.89 Franchisees can have expectations about their relationship with
their franchisors and expect certain things from their franchisors because of
the special relationship that is the franchisee-franchisor relationship.90
When dealing with the implied covenant, the structural benefits that
arise from the franchisee-franchisor relationship may warrant a more indepth view of the expectations the franchisee has in the relationship.
Benefits in the form of knowledge, experience, research, and reputation
provide the base of the relationship, and monthly royalty payments make it
last for the duration of the contract.91 Operational guidance in the form of
research and training bolsters the contractual relationship and places an onus
on the franchisor to provide assistance to its franchisee.92 These structural
benefits are enforced by contract but also come with franchisee expectations
87. Id. at 2 (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986)). In its order denying Miller’s appeal, the court did not refute Miller’s claim on
the law but simply held that Miller had “ . . . not attempt[ed] to advance targeted claims of
that type below or before us.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 3-4.
89. Indeed, even the absence of a contractual prohibition on particular acts or omissions
does not mean that one carrying out such acts or failing to act (omissions) necessarily falls
short of evidence of bad faith. An act or omission may still be problematic—implicitly wrong
while not expressly forbidden.
90. The franchisee comes to expect and rely on the franchisor for comprehensive and
ongoing training, marketing aids and advertisements, and other support services to further
enhance the relationship. See William Slater Vincent, The Basics of Franchising: The
Relationship, INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING ASSOCIATION (Apr. 12, 2019) https://www.fran
chise.org/franchise-information/the-basics-of-franchising-the-relationship [https://perma.cc/
8VET-QG8S].
91. For the franchisee, benefits arise out of a higher chance of success than in a sole
proprietorship; shorter time to open; the selling power of a known brand; and the use of an
established business model. See Eddy Goldberg, The Benefits of the Franchise Model,
FRANCHISING.COM https://www.franchising.com/guides/benefits_of_the_franchise_model.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/6XD6-JQX3] (last visited Jan. 30, 2022).
92. Notably, the success of a franchise system relies on a proven concept, the franchisor’s
support and assistance, favorable market conditions, and a reputable brand developed by the
franchisor. See Craig Tractenberg et al., The Franchisor’s Duty to Police the Franchise
System, 36 FRANCHISE L.J. 87, 87 (2016).
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for cooperation and support from the parent. It is not in either the
franchisee’s or franchisor’s interest to slack on agreed contractual terms—
especially given the special relationship that is formed which can give rise
to a claim based on violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.93
IV.

LEGAL REALISM

Similar to some employment and insurance contracts, what if it were
possible for franchisees to recover tort damages? It would allow a party to
escape statutory caps that may result in insufficient recovery.94 Franchisees
should be able to recover if they are able to establish a special relationship
or demonstrate that they have no other recourse in the marketplace. It would
circumvent discretion-related defenses and allow courts to uphold the
purpose of the franchise agreement: a mutually beneficial and perhaps longlasting relationship. This is a trend, referred to as the “legal realist”
approach, that has developed in California.95
In Bolter v. Superior Court,96 the California Court of Appeals held
that an arbitration clause within a franchise agreement was procedurally
unconscionable because the franchisor had superior bargaining power, and
the clause required the franchisee to arbitrate in Salt Lake City instead of
California.97 The court used the legal realist doctrine of unconscionability to
invalidate the franchise agreement’s arbitration clause as an unfair market
practice.98 This case is a prime example of legal realist judicial techniques
93. This special relationship is symbiotic in nature. A franchisee that engages in freeriding subjects the franchise system to a possible loss of market share in the region and
delivers inferior products or services to customers. The franchisor must ensure that the
franchisee effectively represents the brand, as growth hinges on whether franchise stores
faithfully represent the brand to customers. Andrew Elmore, Franchise Regulation for the
Fissured Economy, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 907, 916 (2018); see also infra, Part VI.
94. Jessica Stender & Roberta Steele, ABA Section Labor & Employment Law—2009
Labor and Employment Law CLE Conference: Employment Torts 2 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
95. W. Andrew Scott & R. Samuel Snider, California Populism, Contract Interpretation,
and Franchise Agreements, 24 FRANCHISE L.J. 248, 248 (2005) (noting this approach
contrasts the “legal libertarian” approach currently used by the Supreme Court). Legal realism
is a populist idea of “ . . . contract interpretation principles that ‘give[s] judges explicit
discretion over private transactions, freedom to do justice between the actual litigants before
the court, and power to deter what the courts determine to be unfair market practices’ by
inserting themselves into the contractual franchisor-franchisee relationship.” Id.
96. Bolter v. Superior Court, 87 Cal.App.4th 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
97. Scott & Snider, supra note 95, at 252.
98. Id.
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used to further populist goals and correct economic and market power
imbalances in franchising.99
Constructive discharge occurs when an employee discharges herself
because of an employer’s treatment of the employee. In the United States,
courts look towards the events that occurred around the time that the
employee decided to discharge herself.100 In France, for comparison, judges
are not bound by the current classification of the employment relationship—
such as employer-employee or franchisee-franchisor—when determining if
there is an employment issue and how to classify the relationship, so a
franchise arrangement can be reclassified as an employment contract to
receive treatment under the constructive termination doctrine.101 In the
United States, this idea is not prominent.102
Currently, there are no federal laws and only a few state laws that
protect franchisees from retaliatory behavior from their franchisors.103 The
prospects for future legislation in this area is dim. The best hope that
franchisees have for protection from retaliatory behavior from franchisors is
from the legal community, courts, and regulators.104 In line with the
information of a special relationship—in the independent contractor
context—even if the relationship is not characterized as employee-employer,
there still may be relief for an independent contractor in the case of
retaliatory discharge.
In Washington state, federal and state employment discrimination
statutes apply to not only employees but also non-employees such as those
in an independent contractor-principal relationship.105 In Currier v.
Northland Services, Inc., the Washington state Court of Appeals held that
the status of the worker does not matter, and an independent contractor is
also able to bring a claim for retaliatory discharge under the Washington
Against Discrimination Act.106 Currier shows that employers cannot escape
liability for employment discriminatory conduct because of the status of the
employee as an independent contractor.107
99. Id. at 253.
100. 33 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 235 § 8 (1995). See also Holton v. Hart Mill Co.,
166 P.2d 186 (Wash. 1946) (applying the constructive discharge doctrine).
101. Robert W. Emerson, Franchising Constructive Termination: Quirk, Quagmire or a
French Solution?, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 163, 189 (2015).
102. Id. at 190.
103. Robert W. Emerson, Assessing Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc.: The
Franchise as a Dependent Contractor, 19 STAN J. L., BUS. & FIN. 205, 233 (2014).
104. Id.
105. Currier v. Northland Servs., Inc., 332 P.3d 1006 (Wash Ct. App. 2014).
106. Id.
107. Id. See also Sambasivan v. Kadlec Med. Ctr., 338 P.3d 860, 866, 872-73 (Wash. Ct.
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Currier is not a franchising case, but its takeaway can be applied to
franchises. Sometimes franchisors terminate the franchise agreement in
retaliation for the franchisee exercising its rights. Where both employment
and independent contractor relationships receive the protection of antidiscrimination and retaliatory dismissal laws, the same approach should
apply to franchisor-franchisee relationships. This could be especially helpful
if a law or a court holding determines that a franchisee is an independent
contractor because the independent contractor relationship would not
absolve the franchisor of its contractual duties or the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in the termination context. Practically, when a
claim for wrongful dismissal can be successfully mounted against a business
party, be it an employer or the hirer of an independent contractor, the fact
that there may be a franchise relationship between the terminator and the
terminated party should not absolve the parties from their contractual duties,
including the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Occasionally, a court will observe that a franchisor-franchisee
relationship has the attributes of a consumer relationship, with the franchisee
(the consumer) subject to a contract of adhesion.108 The franchise
agreements are fraught with bargaining inequality between the franchisor
and franchisee, resulting in terms that reflect gross bargaining disparity.109
While it is a minority view that the franchisee is a consumer, several states
enforce such claims under unfair trade practices statutes (Little FTC Acts)
under which the franchisee has been found to be the consumer.110
A. Establishing a Special Relationship
To establish the presence of a special relationship (or, perhaps, the
absence of any other franchisee recourse), it is important to distinguish
franchisees from employees. Normally, franchisees are more aligned with
independent contractor status. This is a vital distinction that usually

App. 2014) (accepting, inter alia, the plaintiff physician’s argument that the legal protection
against retaliation “ . . . applies more broadly than to employers, extending to those who
contract with independent contractors. . . .”).
108. Robert W. Emerson, Franchisees in a Fringe Banking World: Striking the Balance
Between Entrepreneurial Autonomy and Consumer Protection, 46 AKRON L. REV. 1, 37
(2013).
109. See Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 373 (Ct. App. 1996)
(stating that franchise agreements are “ . . . usually form contracts the franchisor prepared and
offered to franchisees on a take-or-leave-it basis”).
110. See Emerson, supra note 108, at 38.

2022]

THE FAITHLESS FRANCHISOR

431

eliminates the vicarious liability of the franchisor.111 Indeed, states
frequently have created an exception to the implied covenant in the
employment context.112 Franchisees face further trouble because as
independent contractors, they do not receive better treatment with respect to
a good faith or fair dealing requirement.113 In fact, some jurisdictions bar
tort recovery under the implied covenant and require plaintiffs to recover
under retaliatory discharge.114
The assertion of a claim for tortious breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealings is rarely successful. One example of the many
failures is Ennes v. H&R Block E. Tax Services.115 There, the franchisee had
worked with the franchisor for thirty years before the relationship ceased.116
The court noted that though in effect the fair dealing requirement is present
in every contract, a tort claim is applicable only when a party violates its duty
to act in good faith.117 The court further narrowed the tort claim by requiring
a “special relationship” between the two parties.118 Despite the longstanding
relationship and the fact that the “franchisor controls the sole means of [the
franchisee’s] livelihood,” the court declined to grant tort damages to the
franchisee.119 The court reasoned that to make such an award would unduly
extend what constitutes a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
111. Leela Baskaran, Malaysia, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING MAY/34 (Dennis
Campbell 2d ed., 2018).
112. Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 287 (2014) (citing policy reasons for the
employment exception).
113. Kropinak v. ARA Health Servs, Inc., 33 P.3d 679, 682 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). But
see Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 416 P.3d 1, 11 (2018)
(holding that a person is considered an employee unless
(A) . . . the worker is free from the control and direction of the [hiring entity] in
connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the
performance of [the] work and in fact; and (B) . . . the worker performs work that
is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) . . . the worker
is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or
business of the same nature as the work performed. . . .
In effect, the potential that franchisees may not be considered independent remains strong,
both on the facts in all states and on the law in the leading “pro-consumer” jurisdiction,
California.
114. Kropinak, 33 P.3d at 682. Certainly, constructive discharge, due to onerous
franchisor requirements upon its franchisee or unmet obligations of the franchisor, may be an
alternative remedy for mistreated franchisees. See Emerson, supra note 101.
115. Ennes v. H&R Block E. Tax Servs., No. 3:01CV-447-H, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 419
(W.D. Ky. Jan. 14, 2002).
116. Id. at *2.
117. Id. at *7 (noting that not all contracts breached in bad faith can find recovery in tort).
118. Id.
119. Id. at *10 (allowing the plaintiffs to recover solely contract damages).
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dealing.120
In denying to extend these “special relationships” to the context of a
franchisor-franchisee relationship, the court opined “the most notable, but
not exclusive, example [of such a special relationship] are contracts between
insurers and insureds, where distinct elements are present, such as: unequal
bargaining power, vulnerability, and trust among the parties; nonprofit
motivations for contracting (e.g., peace of mind, security); and inadequacy
of standard contract damages.”121 There are, of course, logical deficiencies
in such reasoning: the court’s contrast of franchise relationships from the
insurer-insured relationship reveals many similarities between the two. Like
the insurer-insured relationship, the franchisor-franchisee relationship
includes the “distinct elements” of unequal bargaining power, with the
franchisor offering a “take it or leave it” franchise contract; vulnerability, as
in Ennes where the franchisee depended on the franchisor for his livelihood;
trust among the parties, especially in a long-standing franchise relationship;
and the inadequacy of standard contract damages, as such damages are
typically inadequate to make wronged parties whole and carry no threat of
deterrence. While it may be frustrating to franchisees, the denial of tortrelated damages does serve a purpose. Awarding tort damages requires
courts to balance two rightful interests: wronged franchisees deserving of
compensation and franchisors protecting their trademarks.122 By raising the
prospects of a pro-franchisee damages award, a court awarding significant
damages would encourage franchisors to act preemptively and minimize the
impact of an unfavorable judgment.123 Potential actions—to protect
themselves from both liabilities and pay for any awards—would include
raising franchisee fees and restricting franchisee actions. In turn, franchisees
would not be interested in paying higher fees and royalties to accommodate
another franchisee’s recovery of extra damages.124
120. Id. at *12.
121. Id. at *3.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
123. Westfield Ctr. Serv. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 432 A.2d 48 (N.J. 1981).
124. John Verhey et al., Basics Track: Franchise Litigation, International Franchise 18
(2017), available at https://www.franchise.org/sites/default/files/BasicsTrack_FranchiseLiti
gation.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PTF-UUBP] (recognizing that franchisees are likely to have
different litigation end goals depending on their franchising future). Indeed, even when
franchisees may recognize the usefulness of acting collectively and supporting one another,
that recognition is unlikely to produce any action that overturns any strongly pro-franchisor
power imbalance. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of
Franchisees, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1503, 1556-1566 (1990) (arguing for the need for state right
of association laws and federal antitrust law reforms bolstering the franchisees’ right to act
collectively); Robert W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Can Franchisee Associations Serve as a
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Franchises are popular because, among other things, they facilitate
individual ownership and operation of their own business. The imposition
of further restrictions would make that dream harder to achieve. Still, the
courts’ typical position—even when franchisee mistreatment is plain— is to
invoke precedent upholding the parties’ freedom to contract and focus on
pro-franchisor contractual limitations. This often excludes any serious
examination of whether and how the supposed precedent should apply.125
B. Rare and Exceptional Cases of Special Relationships in a Tortious
Breach
Ennes noted that a tort damages award is appropriate only for “rare
and exceptional cases” and gave only the example of the insurer-insured
relationship,126 leaving open the possibility of including other relationships
by stating that the insurer-insured relationship127 was not the exclusive
“special relationship” that would necessitate the availability of tort damages
for breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.128 The court
further required more than the possibility that a franchisor could take unfair
advantage of a franchisee.129 This stance falls in line with traditional
jurisprudence. Courts are only interested in dealing with injuries-in-fact,

Substitute for Franchisee Protection Laws?, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 99, 104, 119-128 (2013)
(concluding that for many reasons of law, psychology, and economics, franchisees are
unlikely to avail themselves of opportunities to form or join franchisee associations); Warren
S Grimes, The Sherman Act’s Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians: Small Players’ Collective
Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 195 (2001) (noting that
antitrust law unfairly disfavors franchisees and other smaller businesses); Warren S. Grimes,
Market Definition in Franchise Antitrust Claims: Relational Market Power and the
Franchisor’s Conflict of Interest, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 243 (1999) (noting that franchisees and
franchisors have differing interests often of great importance when parties turn to, or defend
against, antitrust claims).
125. See Ennes, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 419, at *12.
126. In an insurance contract there are two duties that are imposed involving good faith.
Cheah You Sum, The Quagmire of Utmost Good Faith in Insurance Law, in THE FUTURE OF
THE LAW OF CONTRACT 4.13 (Michael Furmston ed., 2020). The first duty is for “[T]he
proposer not to misrepresent any matter relating to the risk [of the] insured. . . .” Id. The
second duty is for “[T]he proposer not to conceal facts which are material to the risk….” Id.
These two duties are placed on the proposer because the proposer is in the best position to
know of the potential risks, and the insurer relies on the proposer for full disclosure. Id.
127. See infra notes 210-213 and accompanying para. in text (while discussing good faith
and fair dealing, outlining basic similarities between insurance relationships and franchise
relationships).
128. Ennes, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 419, at *12.
129. Id.
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ones that are concrete and particularized,130 and this begs the question of
what is “rare and exceptional.” There is an argument to be made that a
franchisor-franchisee relationship is a form of “insurance” in that a franchise
pays—in the form of royalty fees and premiums—to run the business,
receive guidance from the franchisor, and to use the franchisor’s trademarks.
This argument might establish a special relationship, or a special type of
“insured” relationship, for a tort claim. This could make franchisees’ claims
actionable, because an independent tort claim based on a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be brought in court if
there is a special relationship between the parties.131
One potential factor is franchisee inexperience. The franchise
relationship in Ennes lasted for thirty years, and over time the franchisee
likely became less dependent on his franchisor. An unsophisticated,
comparatively new, and inexperienced franchisee presents a much stronger
reason for courts to consider awarding tort damages.132 This is due to the
reliance that inexperienced franchisees place upon the franchisor for
business guidance: many franchise agreements require the franchisee to
participate in ongoing training and routine compliance monitoring.133 This
illustrates the trust inherent in a “special relationship,” which would
necessitate awards in tort for breaches of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
The concept of protecting unsophisticated parties, including
franchisees, is longstanding.134 For example, unsophisticated franchisees
often have more leeway to disregard, in effect, the impact of merger
clauses.135 In contrast, consider Cornerstone Square Associates, Ltd. v Bi130. Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (discussing the requirements for
standing in federal court).
131. James T. Scatuorchio Racing Stable, LLC v. Walmac Stud. Mgmt., LLC., 941 F.
Supp. 2d 807, 816 (E.D. Ky. 2013).
132. Ennes, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 419, at *12 (“The Court finds no trend in the law
towards [allowing tort damages], nor any compelling reason to initiate one.”) (emphasis
added).
133. The sophistication of the parties and unequal bargaining power may lead courts to
look beyond the strict language of the contract and take a more nuanced contextual
understanding of the franchise agreement. In the weighing of contractual terms, the balance
may lead towards a more holistic view due to the nature of the franchisor and franchisee.
Howard Hunter, The Implied Obligation of Good Faith, in THE FUTURE OF THE LAW OF
CONTRACT 2.13 (Michael Furmston ed., 2020).
134. Meredith Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75
MO. L. REV. 493, 494 (2010).
135. Id. at 496. For a discussion of the parol evidence rule’s usage against franchisees and
proposals to reform the rule to reflect franchising business realities and meet franchisee’s
reasonable expectations, see Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Parol Evidence Rule,
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Lo, LLC.136 In Cornerstone Square Associates, Ltd., the tenant gave the
landlord timely notice of its intent not to renew the lease at the end of the 20year lease.137 The lease had stated that tenants of the shopping center would
share in costs of common-area maintenance, and payment would be twelve
equal installments.138 The landlord decided to repave the parking lot six days
before the tenant’s lease was to expire.139 This was a large cost that had not
been included in the estimates for the year.140 The tenant objected to paying
for the repaving because the tenant would not be using the parking lot after
the lease expired.141 The Court ruled for the landlord because the contract
stated that maintenance costs were allocated proportionally at the time the
costs were incurred.142 This may seem extreme, especially when you
consider that the tenant’s portion was around $89,000,143 but in this case,
both parties were sophisticated and substantial business entities who were
not without market power and knowledge.
While retention of an attorney may help the franchisee understand its
situation and thereby presumably avoid the “unsophisticated” label,144 it is
common for prospective franchisees not to employ or even try to have an
initial consultation with attorneys.145 Some potential franchisees have

50 AM. BUS. L.J. 659 (2013).
136. Cornerstone Square Assoc., Ltd. v. Bi-Lo, LLC, No. 2:07-CV-150, 2008 WL
2388124 (Tenn. 2008).
137. Id. at *2.
138. Id. at *1.
139. Id. at *2.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *8.
143. Id. at *2.
144. Courts have considered in what situation a franchisee’s reliance is reasonable. They
cited to Schlumberger and noted that the negotiations were arm’s length, the parties were
represented by “highly competent and able legal counsel[,]. . . .” and the parties themselves
were knowledgeable and sophisticated. Carousel’s Creamery, L.L.C. v. Marble Slab
Creamery, Inc., 134 S.W.3d 385, 393–94 (1st Ct. App. Tex. 2004). The court noted that
franchisees in Carousel were not “sophisticated” because they did not retain counsel and there
was no evidence of an arm’s length transaction. Id. The court later concluded that there was
no dispute that the franchisee lacked representation and the record evidenced that the
franchisees were not sophisticated.
145. Ronald K. Gardner, Jr. & Julianne Lusthaus, Representing Franchisees, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING 329, 331 (Rupert M. Barkoff et al. eds., 4th ed. 2015); Byron
E. Fox & Henry C. Su, Franchise Regulation - Solutions in Search of Problems?, 20 OKLA.
CITY. U. L. REV. 241, 283 n. 155 (1995) (recognizing that franchisees tend not to seek counsel
when negotiating the terms of the franchise agreement).
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turned to cheaper, online legal advice services such as Legal Zoom.146 A
survey undertaken for this article demonstrates the concerns people have
when looking to hire a franchise attorney, including factors other than
money. Specifically, respondents, as prospective entrepreneurs, believed
that the more experienced attorneys would already be representing the
franchisor.147
A second survey for this article asked franchisor attorneys whether
the franchisee was represented by counsel.148 The surveyed attorneys stated
that roughly 26% of the franchisees were represented.149 It is unclear how
many unrepresented franchisees speak to legal advisors on occasion, but the
number clearly is much smaller than it should be.
The Federal Trade Commission also recognizes the need to distinguish
the different levels of franchisee’s experience.150 For example, the level of
disclosures the franchisor must provide to the franchisee varies depending
on the franchisee’s level of experience. As discussed above, there are plenty
of factors and considerations that courts apply to protect the inexperienced.151
With support from a variety of regulations and case law,152 the sophistication
of a franchisee should be a vital consideration when determining the
existence of a special relationship. Also, differentiating legal experience
from business experience should be used to analyze the sophistication of the
franchisee.153
Outside of the franchise context, it is also difficult to find these
special relationships. An example of these special relationships may be
146. Robert W. Emerson, Transparency in Franchising, 2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 172,
219-223 (2021) (discussing how potential franchisees sometimes opt for franchise law advice
and related guidance from online services, particularly LegalZoom, including the charges for
these services as well as the problems with and litigation against LegalZoom and other online
providers of documents and legal assistance).
147. The reason might be the franchisor’s presumed ability to pay more. It could be that
the franchisor is believed to simply have the experience and contacts to hire the very best
lawyers.
148. Emerson, supra note 54.
149. Id.
150. Amended Franchise Rule FAQ’s Question 2, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/amended-franchise-rule-faqs
[https://perma.cc/7YXY-PDLW] (last visited Jan. 30, 2022).
151. Medicap Pharmacies, Inc. v. Roach, 2008 WL 11337474, at *1 (Iowa 2008)
(considering whether the franchisee voluntarily and knowingly waived the right to a jury trial).
152. Kersi D. Antia, Xu (Vivian) Zheng & Gary L. Frazier, Conflict Management and
Outcomes in Franchise Relationships: The Role of Regulation, 50 J. MKTG. RES. 577, 577
(2013) (noting that twenty-two states require terminations to be for good cause).
153. David Gurnick & Sam Wolf, Unconscionability in Franchising, 38 FRANCHISE L.J.
81, 100 (2018).
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government actors protected by a public duty doctrine.154 This doctrine
limits a government actor’s duty to respond to situations where a special
relationship is present between an individual and the actor, not to the public
at large.155 This standard is in place because the government has a general
duty to protect its citizens. However, to avoid undue dependence on such
protection, courts require a special relationship, stemming from “induce[d]
detrimental reliance,” to trigger a duty of care.156 This approach is very factspecific, with no bright-line rule.157 However, the presence of a special
relationship—as a legal conclusion— tends to depend upon whether there
has been dependence among the parties, unilaterally or bilaterally.158
C. An Unorthodox Explanation of Franchisee Dependence
A franchise can serve as a unique relationship between each
franchisee. For example, a franchisee may seek special provisions or notify
the franchisor of special conditions that set it apart from other franchisees.
The franchise agreement creates this form of privity.159 In the franchise
agreement, the franchisor provides express assurances. The franchise
agreement can discuss the term, area of protection, opening of the franchise,
orientation and training, guidance, and more.160 Some assurances expressly
or implicitly provided in the franchise agreement create a franchisee’s
justifiable reliance on the franchisor.161 The agreement provides the royalty
schedules, indemnification, contract interpretation, arbitration requirements,
154. Cope v. Utah Valley State Coll., 290 P.3d 314, 318 (Utah Ct. App. 2012).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 319.
157. Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416, 419 (Utah 1998).
158. Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415–16 (Utah 1986); See also Muthukumarana
v. Montgomery Cty., 805 A.2d 372, 382 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (recognizing the element
of reliance in the creation of special relationship); Tammaro v. Cty. of Suffolk, 224 A.D.2d
406, 407 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1996) (stating “justifiable reliance” is an element of creating a
special relationship).
159. Privity is defined as “the connection or relationship between two parties, each having
a legally recognized interest in the same subject matter[.] . . .” Privity, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This relationship can be created through contract and allows
the parties to sue each other and precludes a third party from doing so. Id.
160. Hyatt Hotels Corp., Franchise Agreement (Form S-1/A) 2–3, 12–13 (Aug. 5, 2009),
available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1468174/000119312509165558/dex10
46.htm [https://perma.cc/ZGR2-P4PL]; Jackson Hewitt Tax Service, Franchise Agreement
(Form S-1/A) (Apr. 20, 2004), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1283
552/000119312504065633/dex108.htm [https://perma.cc/LBP7-WUMG].
161. MICHAEL W. GARNER, FRANCHISE DESKBOOK SELECTED STATE LAWS, COMMENTARY
AND ANNOTATIONS (2001).
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and more. These provisions seem to imply the existence of a “special
relationship” subject to higher expectations of reliance on the franchise
agreement.162 In fact, between half and two-thirds of all franchisees come
from positions of dependent employment.163
Consider a scenario where the franchisee sought specific assurances
regarding territorial exclusivity. Due to the franchisee’s inexperience and
unfamiliarity with common law doctrines such as parol evidence, the
franchisee does not concern himself or herself with the fact that there are no
provisions in the franchise agreement regarding exclusivity.164 Instead, the
franchisee relies on the franchisor’s word. In this hypothetical, there is no
fraudulent misrepresentation if the franchisor could have believed there
would be no issue with encroachment. From another perspective, it may be
almost impossible for the franchisee to prove any fraudulent behavior – any
intentional misrepresentation - on the part of the franchisor. Moreover, could
the franchisee establish his justifiable dependence on the franchisor?
Applying such law-based but practical concerns to the franchise
context, courts should acknowledge the special relationship when the
franchisor exerts a large amount of control over the franchisee.165 For
example, this should occur when the franchisor issues a specific directive to
the franchisee with regards to employment choices or another area normally
under the banner of “day to day operations.” This level of control normally
exposes a franchisor to liability to third parties if the franchisee harms the
third party.166 It also creates a “special relationship” between the franchisor
and franchisee through agency law because of the franchisors frequent
control over its franchisees.167 This special relationship concept should be
162. Stefan Bretthauer, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING GER/37 (Dennis
Campbell 2d ed., 2018) (citing LAG Düsseldorf, D.B., 293 (1988)).
163. Jiri Jaeger & Frederik Born, Franchisees as Consumers, 5 FRANCHISE L. REV. 101
(2018) (citing Buchan, Franchisees as Consumers, p. 42 et seq. (2013)).
164. See Emerson, supra note 135 (on the parol evidence rule in franchising disputes); see
also Emerson, supra note 34 (on encroachment claims brought by franchisees against their
franchisors).
165. Our Mission Statement, Vision & Code of Ethics, INT’L FRANCHISING ASSOC.,
https://www.franchise.org/mission-statementvisioncode-of-ethics [https://perma.cc/7C7L-5L
M2] (last visited Jan. 30, 2022) (“IFA’s members believe that franchising is a unique business
relationship. Nowhere else in the world does there exist a business relationship that embodies
such a significant degree of mutual interdependence.”).
166. Cope, 290 P.3d at 320.
167. PAUL M. COLTOFF, 65 C.J.S. NEGLIGENCE, Vicarious Liability § 150 (2019)
(recognizing that a relationship between two parties is the foundation of vicarious liability).
By contrast, for tort claims, Germany does not recognize a supervisory obligation of the
franchisor over the franchisee and does not consider the franchisee to be a vicarious agent of
the franchisor. Stefan Bretthauer, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING GER/31
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transferable to “good faith and fair dealing” claims and allow franchisees to
obtain tort damages when relevant.
D. Franchisees in Atypical Commercial Settings
The possibility of recovery is also limited to “special relationships”
not covered under the banner of an ordinary commercial setting.168 These
ordinary commercial settings typically involve two businesses contracting
for goods, property, or services.169 This limited group tends to prohibit
franchisees from using this claim to recover from franchisors they believe
have acted in bad faith.170 However, it is arguable that franchises are not in
an ordinary commercial setting, despite the support of this classification
found in current case law.171 While franchises are relatively common in the
modern economy, the method of their creation is not as simple as the start of
other businesses or business relationships.
A franchise agreement can be considered a special type of business
contract.172 In Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sue Sealy,173 the court noted that
while franchises fall under the realm of commercial contracts, they share

(Dennis Campbell 2d ed., 2018). The same is true in other countries such as Austria and
Greece, where franchisees are not subject to statutory rules for agents. Alexander Klauser et
al., Austria, in INTERNATIONAL AGENCY AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AUT/3 (Dennis Campbell
2d ed., 2018); John Dryllerakis, Greece, in INTERNATIONAL AGENCY AND DISTRIBUTION LAW
GRE/2 (Dennis Campbell 2d ed., 2018).
168. See Hackney v. Vascular Solutions, Inc., 2018 WL 2970767, at *3 (W.D. Ky. 2018)
(permitting a tort claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing “only
when the contract at issue was entered into by parties with some ‘special relationship’ that is
‘not found in ordinary commercial settings’”) (citing Ennes v. H & R Block Eastern Tax
Servs., Inc., 2002 WL 226345, *2 (W.D. Ky. 2002)).
169. See 5 TRACEY BATEMAN, HOW GOODS ARE IDENTIFIED § 2:99 (Mar. 2019) (providing
an example of an ordinary commercial setting in the sale of trucks). But see Market Plus
Wine, LLC v. Walker Properties of Central Kentucky, LLC, No. 2017-CA-0021265-MR,
2019 WL 911046, at *3 n.1 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019) (excluding insurer and insured relationships
from an ordinary commercial setting).
170. See Peter C. Lagarias & Edward Kushell, Fair Franchise Agreements from the
Franchisee Perspective, 33 FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 4 (2013) (recognizing a history of franchisor
misrepresentation and abuse).
171. See Ennes, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 419, at *3 (declining to extend the bad faith tort
cause of action to franchise litigation).
172. See Philip Zeidman, Is a Franchise a Consumer or Not?, FRANCHISE TIMES (Feb. 23,
2016) https://www.franchisetimes.com/March-2016/Is-a-franchisee-a-consumer-or-not/ [http
s://perma.cc/QM9Z-W7T4] (noting South Africa has consumer protection laws that apply to
franchise agreements); see also Emerson, supra note 57, at 455.
173. Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 43 Cal. App. 4th 1704, 1706 (1996).
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many of the same attributes as consumer contracts.174 Specifically, there is
an economic inequality between the franchisee and the franchisor that
mirrors a consumer-producer relationship.175 Franchisees are often small
business owners operating their first business.176 This results in an unequal
distribution of both a steady inflow of money and profitable opportunities
for franchisees. While states may enact legislation to protect the small
business owner,177 creating a tort cause of action outside the scope of the
franchise agreement will allow further protection.
Some state legislation tries to protect franchisees by treating them as
if they were regular small businesses. For example, in California, courts
construe the legislative intent of the statutory provision providing protection
to small business owners as also protecting those who have entered into a
franchise relationship.178 In Thueson v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., the franchisee
received the protections afforded to other small business owners when UHaul terminated the dealership.179 U-Haul prevailed for different reasons,
but the law clearly covered small businesses that owned franchises, as
opposed to only covering completely separate, non-franchised, or networked
small businesses.180 The franchise relationship deserves this protection
because it often involves an unsophisticated and highly dependent party. The
relationship is unusual, if not unique, due to a combination of a franchisee
174. Id. at 373.
175. Id.
176. See id.; see also Coraud LLC v. Kidville Franchise Company, LLC, 121 F. Supp. 3d
387, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (stating the franchisees had planned but did not have experience
running a small business).
177. See Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. All Professional Realty, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d
1198, 1217 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (noting California legislation was created to protect small
business owners); see, e.g., Arkansas Franchise Protection Act, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-72201-210 (2019) (prohibiting termination and non-renewal without good cause and prohibiting
franchisor from acting in a commercially reasonable manner and in good faith); see also
Hawaii Franchise Investment Law, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 482E-1-482E-12 (2019)
(requiring parties to interact in good faith); Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act, 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 705/18 (2019) (making it illegal for a franchisor to discriminate between
franchisees); Indiana Deceptive Franchise Practices Act, IND. CODE § 23-2-2.5-27 (2019)
(prohibiting fraud or deceit).
178. See Thueson v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(discussing the similarities between the protections afforded to franchisees and small business
owners); see also W. Andrew Scott & R. Samuel Snider, California Populism, Contract
Interpretation, and Franchise Agreements, 24 FRANCHISE L. J. 248, 248 (2005) (referring to
California as “a dangerous place for a franchisor to do business” because of “California
courts’ reputation for inserting themselves into the contractual relationship between
franchisors and franchisees. . . .”).
179. Thueson, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 676.
180. Id. at 664.
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likely being unsophisticated181 and extremely dependent on the franchisor to
provide intellectual property and guidance.182 The guidance involves
methods of operation, trade secrets, advertisement, and development
techniques. Such a reliance on the franchisor’s word further distinguishes a
franchise relationship from the ordinary commercial setting.183 The
recognition of this lack of sophistication occurs in realms beyond franchise
law. It was even the motivation for various regulations, such as the FTCmandated disclosures, which emerged from the FTC’s Franchise Rule.184
Another sign of the distinct nature of franchising is the recent
controversy over whether to classify franchise relationships as independent
contracts or employment. Some states, most prominently California, have
adopted tests which should lead regulators and courts to find that many
franchises constitute employment. This is because these commercial
arrangements have the trappings of independent contracting between two
business entities but their hallmark is, in reality, an employee-like franchisee
dependency.
The California Supreme Court went against its previous ruling and
adopted an ABC test185 to determine that a supposed independent contractor
181. Some franchisors advocate for an exception for sophisticated franchisees. With that
argument, it must be assumed that a majority of the cases involve an unsophisticated
franchisee. See Paul Steinberg & Gerald Lecastre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the
Franchise Relationship, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 105, 108 (2004) (discussing the franchisee
relationships); see also Emerson, supra note 54 (reporting on a 2014 survey of franchise
lawyers, and otherwise noting that studies show that prospective franchisees tend to take a
foolish, inexperienced approach to reviewing and negotiating a proposed franchise agreement,
including the failure to obtain legal counsel).
182. See John E. Clarkin & Peter J. Rosa, Entrepreneurial Teams Within Franchise Firms,
23 INT’L SMALL BUS. J. 303, 305 (2005) (“[F]ranchisees play little or no role in the creation
or innovation process of the business. They operate within what appears to be a mechanistic
organization, centered on cost effective production.”) (citation omitted).
183. See id. (stating that Illinois recognized that franchisors attempt to “induce”
unsophisticated parties into signing agreements).
184. Lagarias & Kushell, supra note 170, at 6; see Press Release, Federal Trade
Commission, FTC Seeks Public Comment As Part of Its Review of the Franchise Rule (Feb.
13, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/02/ftc-seeks-public-comme
nt-part-its-review-franchise-rule [https://perma.cc/W5C4-HELK] (discussing the FTC review
of the Franchise Rule).
185. Kelsey Basten, New “ABC” Test for Independent Contractors in California (May 22,
2018), https://www.govdocs.com/new-abc-test-for-independent-contractors-in-california/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/3RRM-AWGN]:
The test presumes all workers are classified as employees unless the company
can demonstrate all three ABC factors are met: 1. The worker is free from the
control and direction of the hirer in connection with performing the work, 2. The
worker performs work outside of the usual course of the hiring entity’s business,
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may in fact be an employee.186 The decision, in Dynamex Operations West,
Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles,187 left many questions unanswered, an
outcome particularly vexing for some California businesses, including
franchisors and franchisees.188 The state legislature moved to make the
Dynamex decision statutory law, with some push from worker advocates and
labor unions.189 The new law goes beyond the Dynamex decision by
protecting even more people as employees than were covered under
Dynamex.190 In effect, California maintained its lead, and influence, in
expanding worker protections to those previously viewed as distinct,
typically unprotected independent hires.191 The state initially became one of
the first to codify the ABC test into law,192 and a few years later, effective
January 1, 2020, the California legislature enacted “AB-5,” which expands
the scope of Dynamex Operations193 even further.194 The ongoing policy
[and] 3. the worker is usually engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation or business of the same nature as the work performed for the hiring
entity
186. See Dynamex Operations, supra note 113 (discussing the Dynamex case and the
“ABC” test for determining employment status as opposed to independent contractor status).
187. Dynamex Operations, supra note 113.
188. See Independent Contractor Rules Rewritten in California, Fisher Phillips (Sept. 11,
2019), https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-alerts-independent-contractor-rules-rewritte
n-in-california [https://perma.cc/X94M-77NE] (discussing a new franchise law in California
making it much more difficult to classify workers as independent contractors).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Proponents of protecting independent contractors focus on higher-minimum wages
and employer-provided insurance benefits, however, overlook the fact that a franchisee may
be operating as a third party. There are times in which the franchisee is the employer and other
times where the franchisee is dependent on the franchisor. This may call for a quasiindependent contractor status for the franchisee, affording protections in the proper contexts
when necessary. For a discussion on quasi-independent employees, see Mitchell H.
Rubenstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An Analysis of Employees and
Employers Who Operate in the Borderland Between an Employer and Employee Relationship,
14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 606 (2012).
192. Andrew G. Malik, Worker Classification and the Gig-Economy, 69 RUTGERS U.L.
REV. 1729, 1744 (2017). In Dynamex, the California Supreme Court set forth a new, stringent,
three-factor test that is used in determining proper worker classification for purposes of
California’s wage order rules. 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018). With analysis rooted in the ABC test,
the court held that the burden of proof is on the hirer, who is compelled to meet a very high
bar because the worker is presumed to be an employee for California wage order purposes
unless all three of the ABC factors exist. Id.
193. See Dynamex Operations, supra note 113.
194. The California legislature codified the common law ABC test in AB-5 (CA A.B. No.
5 (2019), where workers are now considered to be employees who are “suffer[ed] or
permit[ted] to work” under wage orders unless the employer is able to establish the three
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conflict over “independent” status and employment continues, now even via
plebiscites.195
V. EXPANDING THE GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING CLAIM
Franchisee dependency is further emphasized because the
franchisee’s actions are restricted until the franchisor gives approval. For
example, a group of franchisees sued Dunkin’ Donuts for failing to respond
to a fall in the Dunkin’ Donuts market share in Quebec, Canada.196 The
franchisees worried that the franchisor would not revitalize the brand and
factors of the ABC test. Recall that these factors are: (1) the worker is free from the control
and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work, both under
the contract for the performance of the work and in fact; (2) the worker performs work that is
outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (3) the worker is customarily
engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as
the work performed. See Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Financing, 939 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2019);
Ekaterina Napalkova & Pietro A. Deserio, Worker Classification after Dynamex, Not as
Simple as ABC, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Aug. 13, 2019) https://www.natlawreview.com
/article/podcast-worker-classification-after-dynamex-not-simple-abc [https://perma.cc/PD6Q
-79LT]. AB-5 took the ABC test to a broader scale, applying the test to independent
contractors beyond just wage orders, including labor code and unemployment insurance code.
Vazquez, supra; Napalkova & Deserio, supra. This was a departure from the previously used
common law test held in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc., v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, which focused
on whether the principal has the right to control the manner and means of the worker’s
completion of the services. 769 P.2d 399, 405 (Cal. 1989). Under AB-5, the ABC test was
now to be uniformly applied across industries, as an attempt to streamline classification issues.
195. In a dramatic turn of events and through millions of dollars spent in lobbying,
California voters overwhelmingly approved Proposition 22, allowing gig-economy
companies to continue treating drivers as independent contractors. Proposition 22 greatly
undermines California lawmakers efforts to regulate gig-economy companies, allowing
companies such as Uber and Lyft to continue to classify their drivers as independent
contractors with limited benefits. See Kate Conger, Uber and Lyft Drivers in California Will
Remain Contractors, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020) (https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/11/04/technology/california-uber-lyft-prop-22.html) [https://perma.cc/PQC4-YPV8]
(discussing how Uber and Lyft drivers will continue to be treated as independent contractors).
However, as a major setback for ride-hailing and delivery companies, a California state
Superior Court Judge has ruled that Proposition 22 is unconstitutional because it infringes on
the power of the legislature—a ballot initiative cannot be amended after it is passed by voters.
All is not lost for gig-economy classifications, however, as this ruling is set to be appealed,
prolonging the process. See Margot Roosevelt & Suhauna Hussain, Prop. 22 is Ruled
Unconstitutional, A Blow to California Gig Economy Law, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 20,
2021) (https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-08-20/prop-22-unconstitutional) [https:
//perma.cc/PJ9P-YJJJ] (discussing California legislature regarding independent contractors).
196. See Andraya Frith, Eric Préfontaine & Gillian Scott, La Belle Province: A Practical
Business Guide to Key Legal Issues When Franchising in Quebec, 36 FRANCHISE L.J. 303,
319 (2016) (discussing a suit brought against Dunkin’ Donuts by its franchisees).
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strategy to compete against rising businesses, such as the large and growing
Tim Hortons restaurant chain headquartered in Toronto.197 The franchisees
were, in effect, trapped; they tried to adapt without having garnered
franchisor approval, and that could have been in violation of their franchise
agreements. Instead of focusing on what the franchisees had a right to do,
the opinion was about what the franchisees had a right to expect from the
franchisor. The franchisor did not take into account the market
developments: as a result, the franchisor was not innovating and passing on
the innovation to the franchisees. The loss of market share incurred by the
franchisees violated the essence of the franchise relational contract. The
franchisees had a right to ongoing savoir-faire, but were denied such
innovation. In effect, the decision permitted franchisees to take matters into
their own hands.
While the situation occurred outside the United States’ borders, it
reveals a predicament that U.S.-based franchisees also may encounter.198
The French concept of “savoir faire[,]” or know-how, was an element in the
court’s decision in the Dunkin’ Donuts case, but this is not a commonly
considered concept by U.S. courts,199 so it is possible that an American court
would have held differently. In the Dunkin’ Donuts case, the Quebec
Superior Court held that Dunkin’ was liable to its Quebec franchisees for
breach of contract and allowed the franchisees to terminate their leases
because the franchisor had failed to protect its franchisees’ market share by
maintaining the strength of the Dunkin’ brand in Quebec in the face of the
“Tim Hortons onslaught.”200
The French courts do not have a set definition of savoir-faire201 but
197. Id.
198. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Savoir Faire, 90 TUL. L. REV. 589, 592 (2016)
(discussing issues franchisees may face regarding savoir-faire).
199. Id.
200. See Bertico Inc. v. Dunkin’ Brands Can. Ltd., 2012 CanLII 2809 (Can. Que. Super.
Ct.), aff’d sub nom. Dunkin’ Brands Can. Ltd. v. Bertico Inc., 2015 CanLII 624 (Can. Que.
Ct. App.). Instead of focusing on what the franchisees had a right to do, the opinion in effect
was about what the franchisees had a right to expect from the franchisor. In Bertico, the
franchisor was not taking account of market developments and was therefore not innovating
and passing on the innovation to the franchisees; this violated the essence of the franchise
relational contract. The franchisees had a right to this ongoing savoir-faire. One can conclude
that Bertico implicitly gave permission for ignored, unaided franchisees to take matters into
their own hands (e.g., foregoing the payment of royalties, suing the franchisee for damages,
leaving the franchise network).
201. “Savoir” is a verb meaning “to know.” Laura K. Lawless, Savoir (to know) Verb
Tables, Lawless French, https://www.lawlessfrench.com/verb-conjugations/savoir/ [https:/
/perma.cc/3DDS-QUJM] (last visited Jan. 30, 2022). “Faire” is a verb meaning “to make or
to do.” Laura K. Lawless, Faire- to do, to make, Lawless French, https://www.lawlessfrench
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draw from the EC Regulation on vertical agreements, the Association
Française de Normalisation (AFNOR) norm,202 and the reflections of
scholars.203 For something to be know-how it must have the characteristic of
secrecy, substantially, experimentation and identification.204 There are many
courts in different countries that recognize the idea of savoir-faire and have
incorporated the idea into their jurisprudence.205 Franchisees are dependent
on franchisors’ know-how, but, in the United States, franchisors are not
required to transfer their know-how to their franchisees.206 France, on the
other hand, requires the transfer of know-how in order for the franchisor’s
rights to occur.207
The amount of know-how a franchisor is willing to share with

.com/grammar/faire-lesson/ [https://perma.cc/L297-CXVY] (last visited Jan. 30, 2022).
202. See Odavia Bueno Diaz, Franchising in European Contract Law: A Comparison
Between the Main Obligations of the Contracting Parties in the Principles of European Law
on Commercial Agency, Franchise and Distribution Contracts, French and Spanish Law,
EUROPEAN LAW PUBLISHERS (2008):
According to the AFNOR definition . . . the franchise implies that the franchisor
owns or has a legal right concerning one or more of the signs which attract the
clientele . . . as well as the possession of know-how which may be able to be
transferred to the franchisees and which is characterized by a collection of
products or services of an original and specific character and operated according
to previously tested techniques.
203. Emerson, supra note 198, at 615.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 592. See Florian et al., supra note 4, at 3 (stating in Canada, the idea that
franchisors must help their franchisees is that franchisors have the know-how and the
expertise that is needed for the franchise to thrive). See also John Pratt, Common Law and
Civil Law on Franchising Issues, 26–29 (Hamilton Pratt Business and Franchise Solicitors
eds., March 2020) (noting that in Italy, it is considered a breach of the franchise agreement
for a franchisor to not update, or transfer, know-how to the franchisee).
206. Emerson, supra note 149, at 643–44. This concept is by no means unique to French
law and “can be found in Belgian and Italian franchise law as well.” See Michala Meiselles
& Hugo Wharton, INTERNATIONAL LICENSING AGREEMENTS § 5.02 (2018) (discussing the
concept of transferring franchisors know how to franchisees). See also Dennis Campbell, THE
COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 367 (2009) (emphasizing the
duty of the franchisors in Spain to transfer the savoir faire to the franchisee, including the
design of marketing campaigns and advertising related to the franchisor’s brand).
207. See Emerson, supra note 149, at 643; see also Odavia Bueno Diaz, FRANCHISING IN
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 129 (2008) (indicating the importance of know-how being
communicated at the beginning of the relationship and for the duration of the contract). The
franchisors know-how and assistance are crucial in the success of the franchisee and must be
secret, substantial, and identified. Franchise Know-how and Assistance: How to Assess Them,
FRANCHISE-MAGAZINE (June 21, 2019) https://www.franchise-magazine.com/devenir-franch
ise/savoir-faire-assistance-franchise-evaluer [https://perma.cc/G5ZZ-MVVQ].
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potential franchisees, to attract them, varies from company to company.208 A
study of 100 franchises showed that 67% of the franchises polled had all
training costs at franchisee’s expense and 94% would willingly continue to
provide consulting services, after training is completed, for a fee.209
Notice the similarities between the insurer-insured and franchisorfranchisee relationships. The insured is entirely dependent on the insurer
performing its end of the bargain when there is a need for coverage. In the
event the insurer fails to perform in good faith, the insured has little recourse
other than through the insurer. The insured cannot seek other insurance
companies for protection and an honoring of the policy. This plight is
analogous to what is found in the franchising context. If the franchise
agreement is not honored by the franchisor, the franchisee is not likely to be
able to apply any of the equipment, inventory, or trade secrets to any other
franchise.210 For example, a former McDonalds franchisee may not be able
to use anything from his former franchise if he or she becomes a Burger King
franchisee. Indeed, the ex-franchisee is typically barred for some time from
any significant form of competition against the former franchisor.211 These
non-compete clauses are common in franchise agreements of other countries
as well and aim to protect the knowledge and goodwill of franchisors.212
These clauses often apply throughout the entire duration of the franchise
agreement, not exclusively after the agreement has been terminated.213
208. Emerson, supra note 149, at 606.
209. Emerson, supra note 7, at 691–92.
210. Franchise agreements may be stuffed with confidentiality agreements, non-compete
agreements, and other restrictive covenants that legally prevent the franchisee from moving
forward in the market. The skills and training taught to the franchisee could be applied outside
of that specific franchise, but the franchisee may have to change its location and industry or
wait until the restrictions expire. See William M. Corrigan, Jr. & Michael B. Kass, NonCompete Agreements and Unfair Competition – An Updated Overview, 62 J. MO. B. 81, 85
(2006) (noting that non-compete agreements must be reasonable in duration and geographical
area).
211. See Matthew Ellman, Specificity Revisited: The Role of Cross-Investments, 22 J. L.,
ECON., & ORG. 234, 251 (2006); see also Jeff Fabian, Know Before You Go – Non-Compete
Provisions in Franchise Agreements, Franchise Help, https://www.franchisehelp.com/franch
isee-resource-center/know-before-you-go-non-compete-provisions-in-franchise-agreements/
[https://perma.cc/E9HK-38V8] (last visited Jan. 30, 2022) (“[N]on-compete provisions state
that the franchisee will not, during the term of the franchise agreement and for a reasonable
period thereafter (typically two or three years), own or be involved in any ‘competitive
business.’”).
212. See Elias Neocleous & Ramona Livera, Cyprus, in INT’L FRANCHISING CYP/14
(Dennis Campbell eds., 2d ed. 2018) (emphasizing that non-competes in franchise agreements
are prevalent in other countries as well).
213. See Anca Irena Tudorie & Miha Romeo Nicolescu, Romania, in INT’L AGENCY AND
DISTRIBUTION L. ROM/30 (Dennis Campbell eds., 2d ed. 2018) (discussing the timeline that
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Another reason to expand the good faith and fair dealing claim is to
allow franchisees to act in the event the contract is not yet created or has
expired. Franchising is an expanding business model and, therefore, the
cases of franchisor opportunism are growing in frequency.214 Almost all
cases of franchisee abuse occur after the contract is signed – a time period
that is likely to be outside the scope of any franchise negotiations.215 Since
the abuse often lies outside of the terms of the agreement or the duration
thereof, the franchisee may have to rely on tort law to seek recourse.
One example that requires the expansion of the implied covenant is
when the franchisor opens a franchise near another franchisee.216 This
“encroachment” issue is prevalent in the franchise context and is often
considered the “number one problem” for franchisees.217 Unless the contract
provides a regional clause, the franchisee cannot rely on the terms of the
contract to protect himself or herself. Additionally, a novice or
inexperienced franchisee may not even be aware that a franchisor has the
authority to take such action. This exposes a major policy concern that the
expansion of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing will address.
Consider encroachment. There are numerous examples, such as that
of Steven Scheck, who entered a franchise agreement with Burger King.218
Scheck believed he had been wronged when the franchisor approved a
franchise opening roughly two miles away from his franchise.219 Similarly,
Joseph Davis, the franchise applicant that was approved by Burger King, was
told prior to signing the franchise agreement, that the only other franchise
“on the board” was located far enough to have no effect on his franchises.220
franchise non-compete clauses apply to franchisees).
214. Steinberg & Lecastre, supra note 181, at 106.
215. Id.
216. See Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When
the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 585, 586
(1996) (discussing good faith dealings and franchisee recourse to franchisors); see also Robert
Zarco & Morgan Ben-David, Cycle City, LTD v. Harley-Davidson Motor Company: Can
Statutory Law or the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Override Express
Provisions of Contract, 36 FRANCHISE L. J. 47, 49 (2015) (“In franchising, the implied
covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] is invoked in a multitude of situations, including, but
not limited to, encroachment, transfers, use of advertising funds, and issues relating to
termination and renewal.”) (footnotes omitted).
217. Emerson, supra note 34, at 193.
218. Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 756 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (disagreement
recognized by Camp Creek Hosp. Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., 130 F.3d 1009 (11th
Cir. Ga. 1997)).
219. Id. at 545.
220. Davis v. McDonald’s Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1254 (N.D. Fla. 1998). Davis
relied on the fact that in six years, McDonald’s had built only one restaurant in that area. Id.
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A third example involves Zuri Barnes, who claimed that he was completely
unaware that the franchisor’s policy was to build “restaurants ‘wherever [it
felt] there [was] a potential customer base to support the viability of all
parties concerned[.]’”221 The cases involving Scheck and Barnes are not
unique occurrences, and these types of lawsuits can send shockwaves
through the franchise industry.222 However, both Davis and Barnes were
experienced franchisees, and it is unclear why they assumed regional
exclusivity would come with their franchise agreements.223
Regardless of their own reasons, it is often quite reasonable for
franchisees to believe that they will have some exclusivity or other
protections involving costs, markets, or the like. A franchisee is told of this
tried-and-true system for operating a business,224 and the franchisee is aware
that franchisees reputedly have a higher success rate than people who open
small, completely independent businesses without the benefit of a franchise
network and usually sans the franchisee’s trademark protection and other
advantages, including regional, national or even international recognition.225
McDonald’s did provide in its Franchise Offering Circular that a franchise agreement does
not inherently grant exclusivity in a region. Id. Unfortunately for Davis, four new restaurants
were placed in the area. Id. One of Davis’s locations had a sales decline of around fortyfive
percent. Id.
221. Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420, 1423 (S.D. Fla. 1996). When
Barnes originally signed the document, he believed that Burger King had a “2-mile policy”
with respect to encroachment. It is interesting to note that Scheck had believed that the twomile protection was violated. See Scheck, supra note 218, at 545 (“Plaintiff has stated that he
suffered compensable damages caused by Burger King’s decision to sanction the . . . Burger
King franchise two miles away from Scheck’s franchise. . . .”).
222. See Franchisee Sues Burger King, UPI (May 5, 1994), https://www.upi.com/Archiv
es/1994/05/05/Franchisee-sues-Burger-King/2060768110400/ [https://perma.cc/8VYG-8DP
P] (noting the significance of the Barnes lawsuit).
223. One of the issues in dispute for Barnes’s lawsuit was that the franchisor intentionally
failed to inform Barnes that the “2-mile policy” he believed was in effect was in fact false.
See Barnes, supra note 221, at 1423 (“[T]here is some dispute as to whether the [franchisor’s
sales and service manager] was specifically instructed not to [correct] Barnes.”).
224. Franchisees are expected to operate within a community – i.e., a system overseeing a
network of franchisees and, typically, company units. See Emerson, supra note 38, at 355
(stating that franchisees depend on customer goodwill towards a franchise network as a whole
and that franchisees generate goodwill to the benefit of the franchise network); see also Rick
Grossman, Why You Should Buy a Franchise Instead of Starting Your Own, ENTREPRENEUR
(Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/286212 [https://perma.cc/GH5F-AGA
C] (stating that franchisees share the benefits of the efforts of each other and the franchisor
under the franchise system).
225. ARJUN KAKKAR, SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS & TECHNIQUES FOR
IMPROVING DECISIONS 73 (2009). The beliefs exist, even if they are baseless. See also
Common Mistakes Hindering You to Make Your Franchise Successful, ENTREPRENEUR INDIA
(July 9, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/316418 [https://perma.cc/V7TW-GK7
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Is it a senseless leap of faith for a franchisee to think that his or her franchisor
would not authorize a direct competitor within a mile of its location?226 From
the perspective of a consumer, both locations offer the same quality; so, why
should one travel farther to one franchise location rather than the other?227
In these situations, owning one’s own business can quickly turn into a
nightmare scenario of being trapped in a failing business.
Encroachment is not the only realm in which a franchisee may argue
that there was a breach of the good faith and fair dealing covenant. There
are a variety of operational claims involving “failure to provide training and
support,” misuse of advertising funds, and poor-pricing claims.228 Also, a
franchisor can breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to
cooperate in the franchisee’s performance, doing something that injuries the
franchisee in his or her right to receive the benefits of the franchise
agreement, acting contrary to the spirit of the franchise agreement,
performing a task incorrectly on purpose, and many more.229
The court in Wojcik v. InterArch, Inc.230 held that a franchisor could
be held liable for breaching the covenant of good faith and fair dealing if the
franchisor gives itself broad discretion over the franchisor’s performance and

W] (discussing various reasons leading to franchise failures, including mismatched
expectations between the franchisor and the franchisee).
226. But see Franchise Encroachment, Part 1, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 6, 2000), https://ww
w.entrepreneur.com/article/34048 [https://perma.cc/GBB7-V3R6] (“These ‘issues’ aren’t
true disputes . . . but are based instead on a franchisee’s unhappiness with previously agreedto terms.”).
227. See id. See Kazi v. KFC US LLC, Civil Action No 19-cv-03300-RBJ (D. Colo. May.
17, 2021) (also 2021 WL 1978754) (denying summary judgment on the plaintiff franchisee’s
one surviving claim against the franchisor, one for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in how franchisor KFC administered its program for calculating the impact on the
plaintiff if KFC opened another allegedly encroaching franchise; it is not merely secondguessing KFC’s business judgment if evidence suggests not just that the KFC impact study
was flawed, but that KFC acted in bad faith because it knew the study was flawed and
nonetheless accepted it without conducting any meaningful further analysis).
228. IRIS FIGUEROA ROSARIO ET AL., BASICS TRACK: FRANCHISE LITIGATION 48–52 (2018),
https://www.franchise.org/sites/default/files/BasicsTrack_FranchiseLitigation_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5SQH-K7AF].
229. See Catherine Pastrikos Kelly, What You Should Know about the Implied Duty of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, ABA (July 26, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups
/litigation/committees/business-torts-unfair-competition/practice/2016/duty-of-good-faithfair-dealing/ [https://perma.cc/EZ7Y-KJ4S] (discussing a franchisors duty of good faith and
fair dealings).
230. See Wojcik v. InterArch, Inc., No. 13-cv-1332, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157853 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 4, 2013) (discussing a case in which a franchisor was found guilty of breaching its
duty of good faith and fair dealings).
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does not exercise good faith in the discretion.231 In Pennsylvania, the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not implied in every contract as it
is in the UCC.232 Judge Pratter dismissed the franchisee’s claim for breach
of implied covenant in Azmi Takiedine v. 7-Eleven, Inc.233 because the
franchisee had continued to operate his franchise.234
In the United States, franchisors can be held accountable for a
particular abuse of their power or more general wrongs. For the former, the
U.S. District Court of Connecticut provided a good example by holding that
a franchisor undermined its franchisees’ operations by selling products
through supermarkets.235 As to more general “infractions,” almost any
failure to provide the typical goods or services can be the basis for a claim
against the franchisor. The franchisor’s training, support, and overall
expertise, which are to be provided initially and on an ongoing basis to the
franchisee, constitute one of the most important features of franchising,236
going to the heart of franchise economic viability as a going concern.237 The
231. Id.
232. See Craig R. Tractenberg, Breach of Implied Covenants in PA, FOX ROTHCHILD:
FRANCHISE L. UPDATE COMMENT. ON BUS. & LEGAL ISSUES OF FRANCHISING (Aug. 31, 2019),
https://franchiselaw.foxrothschild.com/2019/08/articles/legal-decisions/breach-of-impliedcovenants-in-pa/ [https://perma.cc/BC74-FBGG] (discussing that not all of Pennsylvania’s
laws of good faith and fair dealings are implied in all contracts).
233. Takiedine v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 2020 WL 5260514 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
234. See Tractenberg, supra note 232. Pennsylvania law says that a franchisor has a duty
of good faith and “commercial reasonableness when terminating a franchise for reasons not
explicit in the agreement.” Id. While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has inferred a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing outside of franchise termination disputes, the district
courts have followed the explicit limitation to apply this covenant to only termination
disputes. Id.
235. See Carvel Corp. v. Baker, 79 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding that a franchisor
undermined its franchisees by selling the franchisor’s products in other markets).
236. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses and the Franchisor’s Duty of
Care Toward Its Franchisees, 72 N.C. L. REV. 905, 939 (1994); see also Thomas J. Power,
Fast Food Sweatshops: Franchisors as Employers Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 19
C.U.N.Y. 337, 355 (2016) (showing that McDonald’s cites its excellent training as a reason
to become a franchisee); Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc., Labor & Empl. L. P 60794
(C.C.H.), 2010 WL 11271008 (Mar. 23, 2010) (discussing that all franchise owners are
required to attend training programs).
237. See Steinberg & Lecastre, supra note 181, at 131 & 131 n.119 (quoting a Great Earth
Vitamin Stores “We Are Family” advertisement that states, “As one of our Franchisees, you’ll
feel like a valued member of a family . . . entrepreneurs who receive the personal attention,
training, and support they need to succeed.”); Craig Tractenberg et al., The Franchisor’s Duty
to Police the Franchise System, 36 FRANCHISE L.J. 87, 87 (2016) (stating,
The viability of a franchise system relies notably upon a proven concept; the
franchisor’s support and assistance; favorable market conditions; constant
innovation; and, finally, a reputable brand. The non-exclusive right to use these
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing has similarly found that franchisors
breached the covenant by not providing such support, even where the support
was not contractually guaranteed.238
Consider further that the franchisee is already extremely limited by
his bargaining power and knowledge. As noted above, normally the
franchisee is provided with a “take-it-or-leave-it” agreement and is unable to
negotiate regional protection.239 In another scenario, the franchisee may not
be aware such a problem exists. Many franchisees fail to hire, from the
outset (or maybe even at all), the independent legal counsel they truly need
before seriously contemplating and entering into a franchise agreement.240
Some individuals seek online help from websites such as “Legal Zoom”
without even considering the possibility that the franchisor might place a
competing franchise in close proximity. Thus, if the franchise agreement
does not, for whatever reason, have a clause addressing the issue, a
franchisee must rely on an award outside of the realm of contract law.
Another example of uncontracted terms is an implied term to take
reasonable measures to help support the brand and the franchisees relying on
it.241 The implied duty of ongoing support is recognized domestically and
internationally,242 but what is expected is rather vague. There are some
assets is, in effect, what the franchisee acquires when it pays the initial fee and,
subsequently, the ongoing royalty fees.
238. See GLADYS GLICKMAN, FRANCHISING: LEGAL, BUSINESS AND TAX CONSIDERATIONS
MODERN FRANCHISING, § 3.03[4] (2018) (concluding, “A franchisor will typically be in
breach of the franchise agreement if the franchisor fails to train and supervise the franchisee”;
also noting that a franchisor’s furnishing of “adequate training and assistance to its franchise
can aid the franchisor [give it the justification needed] in terminating a noncompliant
franchisee.” Changes create the need for ongoing training so that the franchise system can
adapt to a changing marketplace. “Franchisors should also consider the need for field support
to supervise and provide additional training to franchisees.”); see, e.g., 2 W. MICHAEL
GARNER, FRANCHISE & DISTRIBUTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 8:29 (2019) (discussing a case
where “the franchisor did not have a contractual obligation to provide any training, marketing,
or other materials to the franchisee” and the court ruled that an implied covenant could be
breached even though the breach was not of an expressed contractual provision).
239. By contrast, franchisor-franchisee negotiations are common, at least generally, in
other countries, such as Israel. There, negotiating terms “is the norm, not the exception.”
Peggy Sharon & Inbal Natan-Zehavi, Israel, in INT’L FRANCHISING ISR/1, ISR/2 (Dennis
Campbell eds., 2d ed. 2018).
240. Emerson, supra note 54.
241. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (discussing the Dunkin’ Donuts case in
Quebec (Bertico) and savoir-faire.
242. Stephen Giles & Rupert M. Barkoff, Australian Franchise Law: How to Avoid Being
a Shrimp on the Australian Franchising Barbecue, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 164, 168 (2010); Frith
et al., supra note 196, at 320; Tractenberg et al., The Franchisor’s Duty to Police the
Franchise System, 36 FRANCHISE L.J. 87, 87 (2016).
OF
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instances in which the franchisor may include a provision regarding ongoing
support.243 However, when there is no discussion of the term, the implied
covenant may be vital to assisting a wronged franchisee.
The final reason to divert from the original rule and allow for tortbased franchisee claims is to discourage franchisors from breaching the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In the event the franchisor does
breach the covenant or take actions similar thereto, the franchisee is limited
in damages despite any willful or malicious actions the franchisor may have
taken. To go outside the box of contract-based claims and encourage
individuals to engage in franchise relationships by lowering the risk of “bad
faith,” an expansive notion of good faith and fair dealing should be
adopted.244
VI.

FRANCHISOR PROTECTION

A. Free-Riding and Franchisee Protection Overall
Some protections are granted to franchisees in specific industries,245
but overall the franchisee occupies a dangerous position.246 With respect to
franchisors, the allowance of tort damages can be used as a weapon against
free riding. Franchisees engaged in free riding can be viewed as breaching

243. See e.g., Burger King Corporation v. E-Z Eating 8th Corp., No. 07-20181-CIVCOOKE/BROWN, 2008 WL 11330709 at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2008) (discussing a
franchisors duty to provide continuous support); Allegra Network LLC v. Alpha Omega Print
& Imaging, Inc., No. 12-10346 2012 WL 12930591 at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2012) (noting
that the franchisor had a duty to provide “continuing consultation service and ongoing support
on all facets of operating a Center, including such topics as business operation, marketing,
management, technical, pricing, sales and advertising and promotional materials and
programs.”).
244. This might serve as a counterweight to the highly restrictive parameters for “good
faith and fair dealing” so often set forth in the franchise agreements and disclosed in the
Franchise Disclosure Documents (FDDs). The author’s review of 500 FDDs from the year
2020 – covering all industries (including lodging, restaurants, services, education, exercise,
and other fields), all regions, and close to one-sixth of all extant U.S. franchise systems –
found that over half of them – 270 – had clauses specifically stating that the franchisee waived
any claims for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, that the express
(quite pro-franchisor) terms of the franchise agreement negated any possible contrary terms
under an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or that no covenant will imply any
rights or duties inconsistent with a fair construction of the agreement’s provisions.
245. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-18 (2018) (prohibiting a franchisor from granting,
relocating, reopening or reactivating a franchise . . . if it will be injurious to another franchise).
246. See Emerson, supra note 54, at 714 (describing the need for franchisee protection
laws as well as the difference in bargaining power).
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the “covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”247 A franchisee might free ride
by lowering its cost and the quality of its goods or services.248 Franchisors
can admonish against this behavior by threatening to bring tort damages.
Tort damages, however, must be weighed against the appearance of
immediate economic benefit to the franchisees who are free riding.249 A
franchisee may decide to free ride because free-riding can allow it to keep
charging the same prices as the other franchisees while lowering the quality
of its products or services.250 The free-riding franchisee makes a quick and
247. Franchising law and practice often concerns issues such as the prevention of freeriding franchisees and the overall incentivizing of productivity among all franchise units. See
Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of U.S. of America, Inc., 646 F.3d 983,
988 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting the disincentivizing nature of free riding); Gillian K. Hadfield,
Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, STAN. L. REV. 927,
949-950 (1990); see also David J. Kaufman et al., A Franchisor Is Not the Employer of Its
Franchisees or Their Employees, 34 FRANCHISE L. J. 439, 447 (recognizing the franchisor’s
goal of maximizing productivity and profitability); see Adi Ayal & Uri Benoliel, Revitalizing
the Case for Good Cause Statutes: The Role of Review Sites, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 331,
339 (2014) (discussing and proposing different legal methods by which franchisors combat
the threat of free-riding franchisees); see also Emerson, supra note 38, at 354-355 (discussing
the issue posed by free-riders to the franchise system).
248. Emerson, supra note 38.
249. See generally, Stojan Arnerstal & Anders Fernlund, The Outer and Inner Dimensions
of Protecting Franchising Concepts, 14 INT’L J. FRANCHISING L. 3, 6 (2016) (pointing out that
free-riding may not only trigger breach of contract claims, but also other remedies, including
trademark law and tort). The Seventh Circuit poses an interesting standard for tort claims,
encompassing the free-riding issue. The Court imposes a “bad motive” standard, where
discretionary decisions that happen to result in economic disadvantage are of no legal
significance without the requisite intention. Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie
CO. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992).
250. See e.g., S.M. Amdae, Rational Choice Theory, Britannica, https://www.britannica.c
om/topic/rational-choice-theory [https://perma.cc/ZU8C-ZFDS] (last visited Jan. 30, 2022)
(stating that rational choice theory is the assumption that people will act in a way “that is most
in line with their personal preferences”); SooCheong Jang & Kwangmin Park, A sustainable
franchisor-franchisee relationship model: Toward the franchise win-win theory, 76 INT’L J.
HOSP. MGMT. 13, 21–22 (Jan. 2019) (noting that additional, empirical studies would be
needed to test for free-riding, but concluding that franchisees “are willing to continue their
current franchise business only when they are satisfied with a franchisor’s fairness, autonomy,
formalization, and support”); see also Adi Ayal & Uri Benoliel, Good-Cause Statutes
Revisited: An Empirical Assessment, 90 IND. L. J. 1178, 1183-1184 (2015) (stating,
the franchisee's incentive to free ride derives from two central cumulative factors:
On one hand, the individual franchisee fully internalizes the benefits of her free
riding. On the other hand, the individual franchisee incurs only part of the
reputational costs suffered by the franchise brand name due to her free-riding
behavior
further concluding,
Since franchisees use a common brand as a trademark, a reduction in quality by
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large profit,251 but causes long-term damage to the goodwill of the
overarching franchise. Enforcement of any proscription against free-riding
may be limited to tort damages for breaching the “covenant of good faith and
fair dealing” – in effect, reversing, with a damages award, a bad-faith
termination by the franchisor.252
Generally, free-riding by one franchisee weakens the potential
power of the franchise group as a whole.253 In the long haul, this causes nonfree-riders to experience a decrease in value and loss of profits.254
Franchisors may try to prevent free-riding by charging high fees upfront and
regulating decision making.255 This strategy affects all franchisees, even
one free-riding franchisee has the effect of reducing future demand facing all
franchisees, not just that of the individual franchisee providing reduced quality.
The free-riding franchisee is thus able to externalize a large portion of the
reputational costs imposed on the franchise brand by her behavior.
251. “[T]he individual franchisee incurs only part of the reputational costs suffered by the
franchise brand name due to her free-riding behavior.” Ayal & Benoliel, supra note 250, at
1183.
252. See Ayal & Benoliel, supra note 250, at 1183 (“[T]he individual franchisee incurs
only part of the reputational costs suffered by the franchise brand name due to her free-riding
behavior.”); see also Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, BUS. FRANCHISE
GUIDE P. 1250 (2018) (noting that some courts require franchisors to act in good faith in
exercising their termination and nonrenewal rights); see also Ayal & Benoliel, supra note
250, at 1179 (stating seventeen states have a statutory requirement that there be good faith,
on the part of the franchisor, as a condition for the termination of the franchise relationship).
253. Emerson, supra note 34, at 276–77; see also L Stewart, Free Riding Problem in
Franchising (Dec. 2, 2008), https://lesstewart.wordpress.com/2008/12/02/free-riding-proble
m-in-franchising/ [https://perma.cc/75AJ-TRK7] (“The free rider problem manifests itself in
two principal ways within franchising. One, franchisees can free ride . . . by taking the benefits
of being within the system but not paying the price . . . Two, franchisees can cheat by ripping
off their peers; other franchisees within an independent franchisee association”).
254. Emerson, supra note 38, at 355; see also J. Chappelow, Free Rider Problem,
INVESTOPEDIA (Jul. 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/free_rider_problem.as
p. [https://perma.cc/C2NL-WMEJ] (“To the free rider, there is little incentive to contribute to
a collective resource since they can enjoy its benefits even if they don’t. As a consequence,
the producer of the resource cannot be sufficiently compensated [and] the shared resource
must be subsidized in some other way.”). “If a franchisee withholds effort and successfully
free rides on the franchisor’s brand name, this may reflect poorly on perceived brand quality
and lead to poor organizational performance.” Roland E. Kidwell et al., Antecedents and
Effects of Free Riding in the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 22 J. BUS. VENTURING 522,
525 (2007).
255. Doug Berry, Using the Franchise Agreement to Discourage Free-Riding (Jul. 7,
2014), https://www.lexblog.com/2014/07/07/using-the-franchise-agreement-to-discouragefree-riding/ [https://perma.cc/J653-JV76] (discussing potential methods for franchisors to
discourage free riding: termination of contracts for “shirking” franchisees, providing rebates
for compliance, and levying fines for noncompliance); see also What is the Concept of FreeRiding in Franchising and Why Does it Occur?, THE FRANCHISE INSTITUTE (Sept. 6, 2017
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potential franchisees that follow the standards. Instead of taking preventative
measures, franchisors can rely on the tort-enhanced implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
The question then becomes: When would a court find a breach of the
implied covenant? One approach is to consider what behavior lacks good
faith, based on an objective, case-by-case analysis.256 Referred to as the
“excluder approach,”257 some common actions are “evasion of the spirit of
the bargain, lack of diligence . . . abuse of power to determine compliance,
and interference or failure to cooperate in the other party’s performance.”258
The list is not exhaustive; it allows courts enough flexibility to consider the
specific circumstances such as the franchisee or franchisor’s sophistication
and reliance.
In a case-by-case approach, courts could also examine whether the
franchisee has “recourse in the marketplace” or some other way to mitigate
damages. A downside to this approach is that the boundaries of good faith
are very ambiguous, which prevents a plaintiff or defendant from knowing
what may trigger an “evasion of the spirit of the bargain.”259 However, a
court may rely on guidance from insurance-related litigation, where a key
public interest favoring tort recovery is to deter bad faith handling of
insurance claims.260
If courts intend to utilize the recourse factor, the focus should be on
the “economic dilemma” that a wronged franchisee or franchisor may face.261
12:01 AM), https://thefranchiseinstitute.com.au/concept-of-free-riding-in-franchising-andwhy-it-occurs [https://perma.cc/BFT7-7CU4] (indicating that some franchisors incorporate
provisions for forfeiture of the franchisee’s initial investment in order to exclude the
underperformer out of the network); see also Ayal & Benoliel, supra note 250, at 1187
(arguing that a conventional law and economics analysis shows that the best wat to reduce
franchisee free-riding is for the franchisor to have the ability to terminate a franchise
relationship at will without having to prove that there is good cause for termination).
256. Diamond & Foss, supra note 216, at 591.
257. Emily M.S. Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A (Nearly) Empty
Vessel?, UTAH L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) (“Robert Summers’s excluder-analysis approach explicitly
concerns itself with fairness, justice, and community standards, [and] it has been and
continues to be employed positively and normatively by the courts to conform the conduct of
contracting parties to an economically ideal, efficient contracting world.”).
258. Diamond & Foss, supra note 216, at 590.
259. Id. One may argue that “good cause” for termination, through court analysis over
time, has actually become a clearer standard in terms of actual, collective judicial holdings.
Emerson, supra note 27.
260. Aron J. Frakes, Note, Surety Bad Faith: Tort Recovery for Breach of a Construction
Performance Bond, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 518–19 (2002). See also Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 396 (Cal. 1988) (comparing the economic dilemma in an
employment dispute context and an insurance company context).
261. Frakes, supra note 260, at 518–19.
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This factor would be more helpful in a franchisee claim because a franchisor
naturally has more recourse than a franchisee has. The franchisor can revoke
the intellectual property licenses and move on to the next franchisee; a
franchisee lacks that same luxury. Additionally, it is dangerous to end the
analysis at that point because the dilemma (the lack of any real recourse)
must have worse financial effects than the more usual breach.”262 Without
deterring intervention, a faithless franchisor might have the opportunity to
lie, cheat, scheme, and defraud without any possibility of repercussion in
excess of where the franchisor would have been if not for the unethical
practices: in effect, it allows franchisors to get away with what they can and
pay after the fact for what they cannot. An award of tort damages, on the
other hand, would markedly change the risk calculus for a franchisor
considering such practices.
The reasonable expectations of the parties is another approach that
policymakers263 may undertake.264 Just as important, it strikes a fair balance
between two parties with different levels of bargaining power.265 California
courts have considered this approach in the insurance context because of the
power disparity between the two parties.266 Generally, the insured party
signs what may be considered a contract of adhesion267 that automatically
gives the insurer more power than the insured. However, if the insured has
legal sophistication or a closer level of bargaining power to the franchisor’s,
the protection is not needed as much.268 A sophisticated or comparable
franchisee will have a reasonable expectation that is closely aligned with, or
at least cognizant of, the goals and behavior of the franchisor.269 Rightful
franchisee expectations could be for successfully owning and operating the
franchised business; earning a reasonable, hopefully optimal, return on that

262. Frakes, supra note 260, at 519.
263. E.g., courts and legislatures.
264. Diamond & Foss, supra note 216, at 594.
265. See Daniel Sanchez-Behar, Note, California’s Approach to the Interpretation of
Insurance Policies, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 577, 596 (2004) (discussing bargaining power between
two parties).
266. Id.
267. See MARGARET TEMPLE-SMITH & DEBORAH E. CUPPLES, LEGAL DRAFTING:
LITIGATION DOCUMENTS, CONTRACTS, LEGISLATION, AND WILLS 107 (Thomas Reuters, 7th ed.
2013) (defining contracts of adhesion and one-sided bargaining power).
268. See AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1265 (Cal. 1990) (discussing
when protections are needed in bargaining power).
269. See id. (“It follows . . . that where the policyholder does not suffer from lack of legal
sophistication or a relative lack of bargaining power . . . we need not go so far in protecting
the insured from ambiguous or highly technical drafting.”).
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franchise investment; and buying into a prosperous system or brand.270
Franchisors should be expected to meet such expectations, if reasonable and
not violative of any express contractual obligations.271 They may do so out
of their own sense of fairness (of good faith and fair dealing)272 and because
that is in keeping with not just the franchisee’s needs, but also the long-term
interests of the franchised system as a whole.273
The next issue to consider is the actual award of punitive damages.
Punitive damages themselves are treated as a last resort when compensatory
damages will not suffice.274 Normally, franchise litigation falls under the
auspices of contract law, which typically does not award punitive damages.
However, sometimes egregious actions in franchise law may result in a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Furthermore,
the shocking conduct may be sufficient to carry the award of punitive
damages.
One “guidepost” the Supreme Court considered when awarding
punitive damages is how reprehensible the defendant’s conduct was
(hereinafter, the “reprehensibility analysis”).275 Within that analysis, the
Supreme Court mentioned three factors that are relevant in the franchisee’s
situation. The first factor is whether the target of the defendant’s conduct
was financially vulnerable.276 The second factor measures whether the
defendant’s conduct involved repeated actions or isolated action.277 Lastly,
courts should examine whether the plaintiff’s harm was the result of malice,
trickery, or deceit.278
270. See Levine v. McDonald’s Corp., Bus. Franchise Guide para. 7890 (CCH), 1982 WL
1019145 (noting the franchisor conducted “extensive market analysis” when selecting a
franchise location); DLA PIPER, EXPANDING A BUSINESS BY FRANCHISING 128 (2007) (stating
a traffic flow analysis is used to determine site locations). Franchising is often about branding.
Supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
271. Lagarias & Kushell, supra note 170, at 9.
272. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of
Incomplete Contracts, STAN. L. REV. 927, 974–75 nn. 208–11 (1990) (discussing franchisor’s
sense of fairness).
273. See e.g., In re GNC Franchising, Inc., 22 S.W.3d 929 (Mem.), 931 n.15 (Tex. 2000)
(recognizing the long-term nature of franchise agreements); DLA PIPER US LLC, EXPANDING
A BUSINESS BY FRANCHISING 106 (2007) (discussing the importance of trust and cooperation
in a franchise relationship).
274. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003).
275. See id. at 420 (referring to this guidepost as “the most important indicium of the
reasonableness of a punitive damages award”).
276. Id. at 419.
277. Id.
278. Diane G.P. Flannery and Jason T. Burnette, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Analyzing
Punitive Damages Reprehensibility, 53 No. 12 DRI For Def. 31 (June 1, 2011), https://www
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The franchisee may be financially vulnerable during the beginning
of the franchise relationship. However, the franchisee is undoubtedly bound
financially to the franchisor throughout the duration of and perhaps beyond
the franchise agreement. Franchisees rely on franchisors to provide business
guidance and other assistance, such as the furnishing of training materials or
goods. It is this provision that makes franchising so appealing to some
would-be “entrepreneurs” who want to own and run a business, but also want
a network, a valuable trademark, and advice – some institutional
“handholding.” The strength of the franchise and the franchisor is a major
determinant of the franchisee’s success. Therefore, the franchisee is
financially vulnerable to the actions of the franchisor. Indeed, any actions
that are outside the covenant of good faith and fair dealings can have a
negative impact on either party.279
Consider a situation in which the franchisor refuses to renew the
franchise agreement280 and thereby affects a financially vulnerable
franchisee. For some franchises, a franchisee will need to invest somewhere
in the range of $300,000 to $600,000.281 With that being just the initial
investment, the franchisee is also obligated to pay royalties and, perhaps, to
order from specific manufacturers and vendors at the franchisor’s discretion.
This may result in the franchisee paying a higher price than what it would

.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6d47f376-a3ae-422d-bb12-fe579d2461e0 [https://perm
a.cc/8GZQ-PJCD] (noting BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) held
that the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution forbids excessive punitive damages, and
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) provided five factors to
guide lower courts determining the level of reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct are:
(1) whether the harm caused was physical, as opposed to merely economic; (2)
whether the conduct showed an indifference to or reckless disregard for the health
or safety of others; (3) whether the target of the conduct was financially
vulnerable; (4) whether the conduct was repetitive or was an isolated incident;
and (5) whether the harm resulted from a defendant’s intentional misconduct.
279. Laws regarding the breach of the good faith covenant are not specific to the United
States. Article 7 of Peru’s Antitrust Law outlines circumstances under which a financially
dominant party has abused its position. María del Carmen Alvarado, Peru, in INTERNATIONAL
FRANCHISING PER/1, PER/11 (Dennis Campbell eds., 2d ed. 2018).
280. Suing a franchisor for failure to renew without cause is a common occurrence.
Franchisees are often frustrated when they are forced to terminate their businesses without a
valid reason from the franchisor. For an example, see McDonald’s Corp. v. Markim, Inc.,
306 N.W.2d 158 (Neb. 1981) (stating the franchisees operated the franchise 196 to 1980).
281. See Don Daszokowski, Most Popular Food Franchises and How Much They Cost,
SMALL BUSINESS (June 18, 2018), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/most-popular-food-fran
chises-and-how-much-they-cost-1350254 [https://perma.cc/AL73-WBZ3] (citing to the
Pinkberry franchise network).
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pay from an alternative source.282 After these multiple payments, the
franchisee is no doubt duty bound and economically exposed to the
franchisor. The franchisee may not see profit to make back that initial
investment until two or three years after the business develops.283
All of these considerations tie a franchisee to its franchisor and
demonstrate the financial vulnerability that a court considers.
A
reprehensibility analysis284 may also be undertaken against a backdrop of
franchise ethics. Codes of ethics, such as those from the International
Franchise Association and the British Franchise Association,285 have, inter
alia, the purpose of providing a baseline for handling franchise disputes.286
When a franchisor has its own personally tailored franchise code of ethics, a
court may use those ethical guidelines to set the boundaries of good faith and
fair dealing. In the pursuit of fairness, while interpreting the ethics codes, a
court should recognize the franchisee’s vulnerabilities,287 examine the
traditional behavior between parties, and, if possible, determine the industry
norms. Note, however, that franchise relationships can be unique, so the
court should be wary when considering how a franchisor interacts with a
variety of franchisees.288
Whether the franchisor repeats its conduct against the same plaintifffranchisee is the second consideration.289 In other words, even if a franchisor
committed the same breach of good faith against multiple, unrelated
franchisees, the courts would restrict their focus to the conduct that was
against that specific plaintiff. However, if a group of franchisees banded
together, courts would be allowed to consider the repetition of actions across

282. See Salaam Farooqui, U.S. Franchisees sue Tim Hortons parent over alleged price
gouging, equity theft, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (July 25, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.c
om/business/article-us-franchisees-sue-tim-hortons-parent-over-alleged-price-gouging-2/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/GRH4-DL2S] (referring to a developing lawsuit against a franchisor for
overcharging a wide variety of items).
283. Ellis Davidson, The Average Time to Reach Profitability in a Start Up Company,
CHRON (July 24, 2017), https://smallbusiness.chron.com/average-time-reach-profitabilitystart-up-company-2318.html [https://perma.cc/9P84-W2SX].
284. Supra notes 275- 278 and accompanying text.
285. Ethical Franchising, FRANCHISE DIRECT (Sept. 26, 2013), https://www.franchisedire
ct.com/information/introductiontofranchising/ethicalfranchising/7/84/ [https://perma.cc/6EG
7-KWXJ].
286. Id.
287. Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc., 376 P.3d 506, 514 (Cal. 2016) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
288. Indeed, industry norms also can be complicated because of the wide variety of
franchise concepts.
289. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
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various franchise agreements, assuming that all franchisees are in business
with the same franchisor.290 Furthermore, the financial benefit of
“combining” the franchisees’ contentions would increase the odds of a
franchisor’s being held accountable for its bad faith actions.291
Collaboration by plaintiffs might be blocked by nondisclosure
agreements prohibiting the discussion of trade secrets, proprietary
information, or information that the franchisor deems to be confidential.292
This is an extremely broad umbrella, and the list may not be exhaustive,
depending on the terms of the franchise agreement.293 As franchisees lack
equal footing with the franchisor, the possibility of limiting this term is small.
The disparity in bargaining power may allow the franchisor to prohibit
discussions of franchising prices or other franchise-related information.
Such a prohibition would make investigating a breach of good faith and fair
dealing even more difficult and costly for the franchisees.
Lastly, the court must examine the subjective intent of the alleged
wrongdoer. Has the franchisor or franchisee acted in the spirit of the
franchise agreement? This should not be a cursory examination. To find a
lack of malicious intent does not, alone, mean that the party acted in good
faith.294 As noted in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,295 “inquiry into subjective
motivation . . . may entail broad-ranging discovery. . . .”296 With the burden
of proof riding on the shoulders of the franchisee, any saved costs from
grouping with other franchisees would simply be categorized anew for the
intent investigation. The presence of nondisclosure agreements once again
could pose challenges for discovering a franchisor’s wrongful, or at least
290. Id. at 420 (“Any proper adjudication of conduct that occurred outside Utah to other
persons would require their inclusion. . . .”). Farooqui, supra note 282.
291. This, of course, assumes that a collective franchisee action is procedurally viable.
292. See Hamden v. Total Car Franchising Corp., 548 Fed. Appx. 842, 844 (4th Cir. 2013)
(providing an example of a nondisclosure in the franchise context). A nondisclosure can
remain in effect even after the franchise agreement is terminated. Id. at 851.
293. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act states that a trade secret is information, including a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, etc. that derives independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to others who could obtain economic value from
learning the information and the holder of the trade secret is making some sort of effort to
keep the information secret. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (4) (1985); see also 88 Ohio Jur.
3d Trade Secrets § 6 (ed. 2018) (including within trade secrets any scientific or technical
information, design, process, procedure, formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, plans, financial information, lists of names, or phone numbers).
294. See In re Mellors, 372 B.R. 763, 772 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (discussing good faith in the
context of bankruptcy law); In re Butler, 174 B.R. 44, 48 (M.D. N.C. 1994).
295. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
296. See id. at 817 (discussing the investigation of intent in the qualified immunity
context).

2022]

THE FAITHLESS FRANCHISOR

461

lacking in good faith, intent.
Fraudulent nondisclosure can exist in a number of different ways,
like when a franchisor does not disclose a fact that he or she is aware that the
other party does not know, the fact could not be discovered by ordinary
investigation, or the other party could not be reasonably expected to discover
the fact, and if the other party had known the nondisclosed fact he or she
would not have entered into the agreement.297
B. Protections Abroad
Throughout the world, suits may be brought challenging the
nondisclosure or inaccurate disclosure of relevant information. In Europe,
for example, a franchisee may have a claim of action against a franchisor for
damages from, or other remedies for, franchisor nondisclosure or incomplete
disclosure.298 Some nations may adopt a high barrier to franchisee actions,
such as that found in Taiwan’s Principle for Handling Cases Relating to
Article 25 of the Fair Trade Law.299 Taiwan requires disclosure by
franchisors, but further provides that a franchisee’s claim based on
nondisclosure must prove “intentional malfeasance or nonfeasance.”300
In April 2020, Saudi Arabia’s new franchise law took effect.301 The
language of the new law is ambiguous when dealing with disclosure and
registration violations.302 The law appears to offer two options to the
franchisee in the case of a breach, either terminate or demand compensation.
297. W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE & DISTRIBUTION LAW PRACTICE § 9:11. OMISSIONS,
at 45 (2019).
298. Karsten Metzlaff & Mark Abell, European Union, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
FRANCHISING EUROPE 1, 42 (Robert A Lauer & John Pratt eds., 2017). In Sweden,
nondisclosure does not mean a franchisee is entitled to damages or to invalidate the
agreement, but the franchisee is entitled to specific performance. Anders Fernlund & Anders
Thylin, Sweden, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE SALES LAW 457, 472 (Andrew P. Loewinger
& Michael K. Lindsey eds., 2nd ed. 2015).
299. The Principle, published by Taiwan’s Fair Trade Commission, focus on harm to the
public interest and – unlike Taiwan’s Civil Code, which focuses on harm to private interests
– the Fair Trade Law demands that there be “harmful effects to the [franchise] market order.”
Wellington Liu, I-Chen Wu & David Lu, Taiwan, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE SALES LAW,
supra note 298, at 475, 497.
300. Wellington Liu, I-Chen Wu & David Lu, Taiwan, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE
SALES LAW, supra note 298, at 475, 497.
301. Carl Zwisler & Gray Plant Moody, Saudi Arabia’s New Comprehensive Franchise
Law, INT’L FRANCHISE ASS’N (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.franchise.org/franchise-informati
on/international/saudi-arabias-new-comprehensive-franchise-law [https://perma.cc/X2A4-S
C84].
302. Id.
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If there is a violation of the registration and disclosure provisions then Article
19 requires franchisors to compensate the franchisee for losses suffered
because of the violation, but Article 19 prohibits the franchisee from
terminating the franchise relationship.303 On the other hand, Article 17
allows a franchisee to terminate the franchise relationship if there is a
material breach of the registration and disclosure obligation, but Article 17
does not allow for a franchisee to receive compensation for the breach.304
Finally, potential punitive damages may also motivate the franchisor to
exhibit its best behavior. Franchisors are able to purchase insurance
protecting against “defense costs and settlement.”305 However, only about
20% of franchisors carry franchise-litigation insurance.306
i. Good Faith
Globally, many jurisdictions have taken approaches influenced by
German and French interpretations of the duty of good faith on both parties.
Saudi Arabia’s new law requires the franchisor to act in good faith, and this
law applies to pre-existing agreements.307 Canada, for example, in addition
to disclosure requirements placed on the franchisor, imposes on each party
to the agreement a duty of good faith in dealing in performance and
enforcement of the agreement.308 The remedy for a breach of the duty of fair
dealing is the right to bring an action for damages.309 The case of Katotikidis
v. Mr. Submarine Ltd.310 provides an example of bad faith in the context of
the special relationship that is formed between franchisor and franchisee.
The franchisor abandoned the franchisee when it was experiencing operation

303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Jacquelyn Connelly, Top Coverage and Underwriting Considerations for
Franchisors, INDEPENDENT AGENCY (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.iamagazine.com/markets
/read/2016/11/28/top-coverage-and-underwriting-considerations-for-franchisors [https://per
ma.cc/68WG-ZZAB].
306. Scott Carlson, Litigation Insurance: Is Your Franchise Protected?, INT’L FRANCHISE
ASS’N (2008), https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Litigation+insurance%3A+is+your+franchise
+protected%3F+Franchisors+should . . . -a0186268159 [https://perma.cc/4X5T-GLLT].
307. Melissa Murray & Eddie Chiu, Saudi Arabia Franchise law and the Implications on
Existing Franchise Agreements, BIRD & BIRD (Feb. 2020), https://www.twobirds.com/en/new
s/articles/2020/uae/saudi-franchise-law-and-the-implications-on-existing-franchise-agreeme
nts [https://perma.cc/8NCM-TF6C].
308. Hanna & Koczerginski, supra note 3, at CAN/5.
309. Id.
310. Katotikidis v. Mr. Submarine Ltd., [2002] O.J. Number 4444 (Sup. Ct.); aff’d 2010
ONCA 673.
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difficulties and violated a legal obligation to assist the franchisee.311 The
court awarded punitive damages because the franchisor violated the duties
of good faith and fair dealing and “betrayed the trust that symbolizes the
relationship between a franchisor and a franchisee.”312 Further, in Canada,
an entire agreement clause does not preclude a review to determine whether
the parties have complied with the expectation of honesty in performance.313
Denmark has a similar approach, in which the parties in the franchise
relationship are held to standards of “good practice” and concerns the initial
stages of the franchise, the ongoing relationship, and the minimum terms of
the franchise agreement.314 There are also obligations on the franchisor that
they must have operated the business concept with at least one pilot store for
a reasonable time before establishing the franchise system.315 Training the
franchisee is required and continued commercial technical assistance given
throughout the relationship.316 Taking from the French, Danish law also
acknowledges that know-how is an important element of a business and
encompasses the information and technology required for the franchisee to
complete business or certain processes.317
The English approach is unique in that there are no specific safeguards
for franchisees that are not generally available to all persons entering
commercial contracts.318 There is no general duty to act in good faith in
contracts, but in Yam Send Pte, Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Corp., Ltd.,319 the court
acknowledged that while the duty of good faith is not implied in every
commercial contract, elements may be implied in contracts involving longterm relationships between the parties who have made a substantial
commitment.320 While this was not a franchise case, the court indicated that
franchise agreements are “relational contracts” and that franchisors will have
to provide all relevant information to their franchisees, whether asked for it

311. Hanna & Koczerginski, supra note 3, at CAN/6.
312. Id.
313. See generally Howard Hunter, The Implied Obligation of Good Faith, in THE FUTURE
OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 2.16 (Michael Furmston eds., 2020) (discussing agreement clauses
in Canada for with the expectation of honesty in performance).
314. Lasse Sondergaard Christensen & Soren Hogh Thomsen, Denmark, in
INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING DEN/27 (Dennis Campbell eds., 2nd ed. 2019).
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at DEN/18.
318. John Pratt & Hamilton Pratt, England and Wales, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING
ENG/27 (Dennis Campbell eds., 2nd ed. 2019).
319. Yam Seng Pte Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Corp. Ltd., [2013] E.W.H.C. 111 (QB).
320. Pratt & Pratt, supra note 318, at ENG/27.
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or not.321 Further, if a franchisor has the power to make unilateral decisions,
they must exercise that power honestly and in good faith for which the power
was conferred.322 A franchisee, however, may have the remedy of the tort of
negligence, if the court finds that the franchisor owed a duty of care to the
prospective franchisee.323 Franchisors are likely to owe a prospective
franchisee a duty of care when giving estimates of potential profits or
turnover rates that may affect the franchisee. Inaccurate information may
lead to the tort of negligent misstatement.324
Courts are divided on the issue of implying good faith into contracts.
The law does not impose an implied duty of good faith in commercial
contracts, but the Code of Ethics requires the franchisee and the franchisor
“to exercise fairness in their dealings with each other and to resolve
complaints, grievances, and disputes with good faith.”325 The Carewatch
Care Services Ltd. v. Focus Caring Services Ltd. court dismissed a
franchisee’s argument that there was an implied good faith requirement in
the franchise agreement and held that the franchise agreement was detailed
about the franchise relationship making it unnecessary to imply any
additional terms into it.326 Other cases have gone the other way, though. In
Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Saeed Bin Shakhboot Al Nehayan, the court held that
parties to an oral joint venture agreement had to act in good faith towards the
other party.327 Also, in Bates v. Post Office, the court held that all “relational”
contracts should apply a duty of good faith towards the parties.328 This case
featured guidance on what a “relational” contract is; indeed, under the
guidance provided, a franchise agreement is included as a “relational”
321. Id.
322. Id. at ENG/32.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Damian Humphrey & John Chambers, Q&A: The Franchisor-Franchisee
Relationship in United Kingdom, LEXOLOGY (July 31, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/libr
ary/detail.aspx?g=eb129fd6-b8cb-4217-872d-0183c7d8f299 [https://perma.cc/3CDR-8A73].
The British Franchise Association is a voluntary self-regulating body for franchises and
members agree to be bound by a Code of Ethics, which has the goal of promoting fair dealings.
Id. It may be considered a “Fairness in Franchising” set of principles.
326. Carewatch Care Servs. Ltd. v. Focus Caring Servs. Ltd., [2014] E.W.H.C. 2314 (Ch).
327. Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Saeed Bin Shakhboot Al Nehayan, [2018] (Al Nehayan v Kent)
E.W.H.C. 333 (Comm). See Damian Humphrey & John Chambers, Franchising in the United
Kingdom, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=97
502adc-d289-43e7-be67-abf1acd6bbf1 [https://perma.cc/JZ92-4LEN] (noting the judge from
Al Nehayan v Kent and Yam Send Pte, Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Corp., Ltd is now a judge for the
court of appeals, so he has more power to decide the issue of an implied duty of good faith in
commercial contracts).
328. Bates v Post Office, [2019] E.W.H.C. 606 (QB).
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contract.329
Israel has an approach to good faith that is modeled greatly after the
U.S. and Europe. The duty of good faith is imposed both in the negotiations
for a franchise agreement and in the performance of the respective
obligations of the parties.330 Due to the precarious nature of the franchise
relationship and the unique risks that a franchisee faces, Israel’s Franchise
Code of Ethics imposes mandatory disclosures of relevant information
essential to enable investors to make informed decisions about franchise
offerings.331 The franchisor has a similar “know-how” requirement as seen
in other countries, obligating them to provide the franchisee with business
guidance and financial guidance.332
Italy imposes requirements on the franchisor akin to those seen in
France. The franchisor is bound to confer on the franchisee the know-how
and confidential knowledge that comes from the franchisor’s own
experience.333 A general description of know-how should be sufficient at the
preliminary negotiation stage, and further details given in an operations
manual.334 There are remedies outside of the contract if the franchisor is
incorrect or false information was given to the prospective franchisee during
negotiations.335 Another nation, Portugal, takes franchisee protections a step
further, as there is no specific law applicable to franchise agreements, and
applies general statutory regimes to impose the principle of good faith in
franchise agreements.336
Franchisors have fought to replace good faith and fair dealing with a
franchising Business Judgment Rule (“BJR”)337 protecting the party making
decisions in the interest of the business entity (i.e., the franchisor acting for
the franchise network). BJR could provide clarity and lessen litigation.338 In
329. Id.
330. Peggy Sharon & Inbal Natan-Zehavi, Israel, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING ISR/22
(Dennis Campbell eds., 2nd ed. 2019).
331. Id. at ISR/10.
332. Id. at ISR/11.
333. Francesca Ferrero & Julia Holden, Italy, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING ITA/7
(Dennis Campbell eds., 2nd ed. 2019).
334. Id.
335. Id. at ITA/8.
336. Maria Paula Milheirão, Franchising in Portugal, LEXOLOGY (June 24, 2019), https://
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8fa7c7b8-cf53-468f-a1a0-3477c1b6bbbe [https://
perma.cc/Q8A6-FD5K].
337. Erica L. Calderas & Jason M. Murray, Good Faith and Fair Dealing – Alive and Well
or is it a Matter of Business Judgment?, American Bar Association 39th Annual Forum on
Franchising, Nov. 2, 2016, at 8–10.
338. Id. For a discussion of corporate governance issues in the franchise context, see
Norman D. Bishara & Cindy A. Schipani, A Corporate Governance Perspective on the
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the corporate context, the law only requires that a party “acted on an
informed basis, in good faith, and in honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company.”339 There is no requirement to act in the
best interest of the contract, which is required by the good faith and fair
dealing covenant. In fact, allowing a personally interested decision may
undermine the duty of care.340
BJR is not limited to the corporate context and the relationship between
boards of directors and shareholders. For example, it can reach partnerships
formed under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act.341 Additionally, if
applied in franchising cases, the fact-intensive nature of the rule would allow
courts to perform, as in corporate BJR, a balancing test.342
The umbrella of duty of care and loyalty is wide. Shifting BJR to the
franchise context, the franchisor would substitute for the director and the
franchise system for the corporation.343 BJR could allow the franchisor to
protect its interests and sustain the franchise.344 Perhaps, the cynic may
opine, the rule gives franchisors the ability to act in bad faith as long as the
action can be hidden under the guise of BJR. Doubtless the franchisor may
have legitimate reasons to take an action, but that decision may harm either
a single franchisee or a more substantial number of franchisees.345 Generally,
BJR could protect these decisions made by a franchisor and lead to a
presumption that decisions were not made with abusive discretion.346 What
about the franchisees? Do franchisees have a benefit or at least a way to

Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 303 (2015).
339. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006); see Lenois
v. Lawal, No. 11963–VCMR, 2017 WL 5289611, at *10 (Ct. Chancery Del. Nov. 7, 2017)
(noting the business judgment rule does not require perfection or consideration of every
conceivable alternative); see also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971)
(requiring only a “rational business purpose” to protect a board member from liability).
340. Brian B. Schnell & Ronald K. Gardner, Jr., Battle Over the Franchisor Business
Judgment Rule and the Path to Peace, 35 FRANCHISE L.J. 167, 172 (2015).
341. Elizabeth S. Miller & Thomas E. Rutledge, The Duty of Loyalty and Reasonable
Decisions: The Business Judgment Rule in Unincorporated Business Organization, 30 DEL.
J. OF CORP. L. 343, 360–61 (2005).
342. F.D.I.C. v. Ching, No. 2:13-cv-01710-KJM-EFB, 2018 WL 621297, at *5 (E.D. Cal.,
Jan. 29, 2018); F.D.I.C. v. Baldini, 983 F. Supp. 2d 772, 784 (S.D. W. Va. 2013).
343. Calderas & Murray, supra note 337, at 8.
344. Schnell & Gardner, supra note 340, at 167.
345. Id.
346. Calderas & Murray, supra note 337, at 9. But see Carvel Corp. v. Diversified Mgmt.
Grp., Inc., 930 F.2d 228, 231–32 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that just because a franchisordistributor, Carvel, had “considerable discretion” in, among other matters, overseeing the
system’s advertising, store locations, and wholesale sales, “did not relieve Carvel of its duty
to act in good faith”).
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overcome BJR?
Since BJR is merely a presumption, such as in corporate law, the
presumption can be shifted. In the franchise context, shifting the
presumption could occur when a franchisor makes a decision in bad faith or
breaches a fiduciary duty.347 Some franchises have started to put BJR into
the franchise agreement.348 Franchisees may find an argument when trying
to prevent BJR from replacing the standard of good faith and fair dealing.
BJR may be harder to apply in the franchise context because, if a franchisor
makes a decision out of self-interest, which is quite common, then the rule
cannot be applied.349 Decisions to switch brands, expand products, or relocate may be self-interested decisions made by the franchisor without any
clear benefit to the franchisee. All of these actions could lead to BJR being
insurmountable. While inconvenient, such decisions may not necessarily be
“bad faith, fraud, illegality, or gross overreaching.”350 So, a good faith and
fair dealing standard may still stand in part because franchisors must act in
good faith, no matter what standard is used.351
Admittedly, courts may be reluctant to apply BJR, which originates
out of fiduciary duties, to franchisees. Many courts review the franchisor’s
decisions by applying the good faith and fair dealing standard.352 In Stone v.
Ritter,353 the Delaware Supreme Court stated, “to act in good faith does not
establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as
the duties of care and loyalty.”354 This breaks the chain between the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing leading into a fiduciary duty and allows the
application of BJR. In the franchise context, it has long been the standard
that franchisors are not fiduciaries.355 This is in line with provisions specified
347. Henderson Square Condominium Ass’n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC, 46 N.E.3d 706,
727 (Ill. 2015).
348. Schnell & Gardner, supra note 340, at 167.
349. Calderas & Murray, supra note 337, at 9.
350. Fields v. Sax, 123 Ill. App. 3d 460, 467 (1984).
351. Calderas & Murray, supra note 337, at 9.
352. Schnell & Gardner, supra note 340, at 180.
353. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
354. Id. at 370.
355. See Van Wie Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors, LLC, 145 A.D.3d 1, 15 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2016) (interpreting Michigan law with respect to fiduciary duties); Pasqualetti v. Kia
Motors Am., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 2d 586, 597–98 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (invoking Ohio statutes,
cases, and the franchise parties’ own written agreement and interactions to deny fiduciary
status, including a specific finding that the Ohio Dealer’s Act “does not create a fiduciary
relationship between franchisors and prospective franchisees”); Prince Heaton Enters., Inc. v.
Buffalo’s Franchise Concepts, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (noting under
Georgia law, franchisors do not owe fiduciary duties to franchisees). This is also the holding
in other nations, such as Canada. Shelanu Inc. v. Print Three Franchising Corp., (2006) 64
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in franchise agreements and disclosed in the Franchise Disclosure
Documents (FDDs).356
However, the adoption of BJR could have some positive aspects as it
would prevent ill-willed franchisees from taking action against a franchisor
for simply acting to preserve the franchise network as a whole.357 If a
franchisor takes advantage of such a provision and places it in the franchise
agreement, the implied covenant will be blocked out.
ii. Fair Dealing
In many jurisdictions around the world, franchise legislation has been
enacted to impose a general obligation of fair dealing on performance and
enforcement of franchise agreements.358 In Canada, the legislation sets out
franchise disclosure laws that require fair dealings. To fulfill the duty of fair
dealing, a franchisor must perform its contractual duties, and enforce the
franchise agreement, all the while taking the franchisees’ interest into
account.359 Before making a system-wide change, a franchisor needs to
consider the entire franchise network’s interest, not only the individual
franchisee’s interest, and the franchisor should conduct a “meaningful
consultation” with the franchisees.360 According to the Canadian common
law courts, a franchisor breaches the duty of fair dealing by unduly
withholding information with the intent to make the franchisee not exercise
the franchisee’s right to renew.361 Also, the duty of fair dealing is breached
when a franchisor unreasonably or abusively exercises its termination
rights.362 Case law has provided guidance on the duty of fair dealing, but the

O.R. 3d 533 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (Ontario law).
356. The author’s review of 500 FDDs from the year 2020 – covering all industries
(including lodging, restaurants, services, education, exercise, and other fields), all regions,
and close to one-sixth of all extant U.S. franchise systems – found that a large number of them
– 325 – had clauses specifically declaring that the franchisor is not a fiduciary for the
franchisee.
357. Schnell & Gardner, supra note 340, at 173 (“If a franchisee doesn’t like the
franchisor’s decision . . . or the decision has any disparate impact on the franchisee’s business,
the franchisee can claim a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”).
358. Floriani et al., supra note 4, at 8.
359. Id.
360. Id. See supra Part V. (discussing the law, politics, and case law of systemic change
within a franchise network; discussing, Emerson, supra note 198, and outlining how the
concept of savoir-faire should be incorporated into the notion of franchisor good faith toward
its franchisees).
361. Floriani et al., supra note 4, at 8-9.
362. Id. at 9.
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law around this area is not set in stone.363 This duty does not override
unequivocal contract terms, so the duty of fair dealing might be mitigated by
franchise agreement provisions.364
The French approach to the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
is a bit different than what is practiced in the United States.365 Specifically,
in France, franchisor development schedules and business plans that do not
live up to their “promise” can be grounds for liability.366 Because of the
potential liability for franchisors and this special “expectation” claim,
business plans should be avoided and left to the franchisee’s sole
responsibility.367 The franchisor in France must be careful about ratios which
are used to draft the franchisee’s business plan. These ratios are handed out
to franchisees, and – “if the franchisor validates or even just keeps silent
about the resulting business plans” - then its liability is “practically
certain.”368 This liability arises in a business and legal setting where
franchisees’ and franchisors’ mutual duties of good faith are intended to
reduce the franchise parties’ risks and thereby “preserv[e] the interest the
franchisees have in franchising.”369
The principle of good faith and fair dealing has not always been
uniformly used in France, but recently, has been applied not only to the
performance of the contract but also to pre-contractual negotiations and
during the post-termination phase.370 In October 2016, French Civil Code
was amended to include article 1.1.4, which states that “[a]ll contracts must
be negotiated, created and performed in good faith. This obligation is a
matter of public order.”371 The obligation of good faith can never be
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Although different jurisdictions have various interpretations of the duty of good faith,
the French and German good faith standards have inspired many jurisdictions around the
world, including Belgium, Austria, Poland, and Spain. See Francesca R. Turitto et al.,
Anatomy of a Franchise Dispute: Lessons for Transactional Lawyers Drafting Franchising
Agreements, 14 INT’L J. FRANCHISING L. 3, 19 (2016) (discussing the difference between the
implied obligation of good faith in France and the U.S.).
366. Id. at 5.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 6 (citing a Court of Appeal of Paris holding in 2015).
369. Id. at 16.
370. Id. at 18. In order for pre-contractual bad faith to be actionable, other tort
requirements must be fulfilled: the damage must have been caused by the bad act, the damage
must be certain, and it must be yet uncompensated. This is based in the obligation to repair
damage caused by one’s act or failure to act. See Nadia E. Nedzel, A Comparative Study of
Good Faith, Fair Dealing, and Precontractual Liability, 12 TULANE EUR. & CIV. L. FORUM
97, 115 (1998) (discussing the obligation of good faith).
371. John Pratt, Common Law and Civil Law on Franchising Issues, LEXOLOGY 7 (May
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excused.372 In line with the know-how requirements of savoir-faire,
franchisors are required—from formation to the termination of the
contract—to support the franchisee with commercial and technical
assistance.373 Furthermore, a party that has acted in bad faith cannot require
the performance of the other party.374
Australia is a federal common law jurisdiction, comparable to the
United States, in which principles followed by the courts of one state may be
different than principles followed in another state.375 Generally, Australian
franchises must comply with the Franchising Code and are subject to
numerous legal requirements and require careful drafting of franchise
agreements. The Franchising Code’s purpose is to assist franchisees in
making informed decisions before entering into a franchise agreement and
to provide a framework for a workable relationship between the parties.376
Civil penalties will be imposed for breaches of the Franchising Code,
including lack of proper documents disclosed to prospective franchisees, not
complying with the obligation to act in good faith, not updating financial
disclosure documents, proper notice with respect to term arrangements, and
copies of all material documents.377 The New South Wales Court of Appeal
held, “the concept of good faith had to be accepted on the basis that it
represented the current ‘expected standard.’”378 Exercise of discretion
should be consistent with the overall purpose of the agreement and not
contrary to the nature of the agreement.
When determining whether there was a breach of the duty of good faith,
courts may consider whether the party acted honestly and not arbitrarily and
whether the party cooperated to achieve the purpose of the agreement.379
Importantly, this does not prevent a party from acting in its legit commercial
interests and does not require a franchisor to extend an agreement at the end
of its term.380 The Franchising Code is stringent with requirements and the
duties for both parties, including marketing requirements, financial
2020).
372. Id.
373. Turitto et al., supra note 365, at 16.
374. Id.
375. Howard Hunter, The Implied Obligation of Good Faith, in THE FUTURE OF THE LAW
OF CONTRACT 2.21 (Michael Furmston eds., 2020).
376. Chris Nikou & Anna Trist, Australia, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING, AUS/1
(Dennis Campbell eds., 2nd ed. 2019).
377. Id. at AUS/2.
378. See Pratt, supra note 371, at 8 (citing to Burger King Corp v Hungry Jacks Pty Ltd.
[2001] NWSCA 187).
379. Nikou, supra note 376, at AUS/7.
380. Id.
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information disclosures, leasing information, transfer restrictions,
circumstances for termination, and dealing with former franchisees.381
Common law jurisdictions, including Australia, Canada, and the United
States, to one extent or another, have embraced a notion of good faith as an
implied obligation in contracts—even though there is variation in the details
and application.382 Civil law countries, such as France and Germany, may
have a more uniform approach to applying good faith obligations, as the
duties are codified and expected by the parties in each transaction.
On June 30, 2020, the Dutch Senate enacted a national Franchise Act,
the first of its kind in the Netherlands.383 The Franchise Act became effective
on January 1, 2021 and it regulates the sales of franchises while imposing a
“good behavior” standard for franchisors and franchisees, requiring
reasonableness in actions depending on the type of industry and the size of
the franchise chain.384 There are specific provisions regarding prior consent
and goodwill that franchisors opposed as restricting business and stifling
innovation.385 These provisions are mandatory, and a franchise agreement
cannot deviate from the requirements established in the Franchise Act,
regardless of the law governing the franchise arrangement.386
The aim of the Dutch Franchise Act is to provide more balance in the
franchisor-franchisee relationship by offering statutory protections to the
franchisee. The parties should behave toward each other as a “good
franchisor” and a “good franchisee.”387 The Act’s opponents questioned
whether such statutory protection is needed, as both the franchisor and the
franchisee already had to behave in accordance with Civil Law principles of
reasonableness and fairness.388 It is unclear how this will affect existing
franchise relationships and how franchisors will react to this very profranchisee law, but it is a significant step toward codifying the implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing inherent in all contracts.

381. Id. at AUS/7–AUS/12.
382. Howard Hunter, The Implied Obligation of Good Faith, in THE FUTURE OF THE LAW
OF CONTRACT 2.46 (Michael Furmston eds., 2020).
383. Benjamin B. Reed & Antonia Scholz, Annual Franchise and Distribution Law
Developments 2020, American Bar Association, 1, 329 (Sept. 15, 2020).
384. Id.
385. Id. at 330.
386. Id. at 331.
387. Tessa De Monnink, Netherlands: New Dutch Franchise Act Has Been Adopted,
INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION INSTITUTE (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.idiproject.com/new
s/netherlands-new-dutch-franchise-act-has-been-adopted [https://perma.cc/5VC5-M29F].
388. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Overall, most rules for franchising – statutes, regulations, and case
law – tend to be franchisor-friendly.389 Franchisors can take risks without
the fear that, ordinarily, courts will second-guess the decision and impose
liability or sanctions for the franchisors’ actions.390
Given this predisposition in favor of the franchisor’s contract, as the
franchisor intended it, the courts, regulators, or legislators could, and
probably should, impose a duty of “faithfulness to an agreed common
purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party.”391
This or a similar covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an underutilized
method of recovery for franchisees. The hesitance is only reinforced by the
courts’ hesitance to breach precedent and the difficulty of outlining the
boundaries of what constitutes good faith.392 Courts are hesitant to rewrite
contracts. Franchise agreements are not signed overnight and, regardless of
the potential franchisee’s sophistication, a franchisee does have an
opportunity to review the terms and accept, negotiate for changes, or even
simply toss the draft agreement in the trash. The argument thus goes, should
a franchisor be bound to presumably fairer (to franchisees) contract terms
simply to make up for franchisees’ mistakes, and often, at least at the outset,
franchisees’ lack of due diligence when buying a franchise.393
Expansion of franchising requires the law, and the judges, to adapt
to circumstances, to the age of disruption. While using the “blue pencil”
may not necessarily be the answer, some sort of judicial quill should be
used.394 Franchisees and franchisors may not act in the spirit of the contract,
and the traditional contract damages may not be sufficient to remedy the
389. See Emerson & Benoliel, supra note 124, at 105 (noting that all federal-level
franchisee protection laws have been rejected and only a small number of states enacted
general franchisee protection laws). By contrast, France’s laws are more franchisee-friendly.
See Emerson, supra note 101, at 202 (noting that the United States lacks most of the “profranchisee aspects that French law possesses, such as savoir-faire, territorial protections,
goodwill, and indemnity”; in turn, lacking the contractual and judicial protections of French
franchisees, American franchisees must contend with “pro-franchisor written agreements
dominat[ing] the [U.S.] franchising arena”).
390. Selman, supra note 67, at 112.
391. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a (1981).
392. See Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 989,
992 (Del. 1998) (recognizing a need for caution when dealing with the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing).
393. See ENTREPRENEUR, supra note 226 (arguing that the imposition of the good faith and
fair dealing covenant is inappropriate).
394. See supra notes 210 & 213 and accompanying notes (discussing that judges should
adapt to expansion of franchising).
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situation. For example, how can a franchisee or franchisor recover in the
event of actions that are not prohibited by the contract, but nevertheless harm
either side of the agreement?
To move the franchise law toward more franchisee protections
aligns with some regulatory trends. This would also not be the first time in
which policy overruled freedom of contract. Consider the freedom of
“master over employee” that was once held in the highest esteem.395 Courts
and legislatures have determined that it is not an absolute right, and courts
do have the ability to take policy considerations into account when dealing
with contract enforcement.396
In the modern era, protection of franchisees is likely to take a back
seat to other issues. The last major economic substantive due process
intervention occurred during a nationwide low point when the courts
believed that protection of the overworked employee was a major policy
concern. In contrast, franchising has been a rapidly growing sector of the
economy and franchisees generally have a higher likelihood of success than
their non-franchised counterparts.397 In comparison, business franchises
were rightly considered prone to danger—a wild, often lawless place until
the 1970s, when California and other states enacted franchising legislation.398
In the current legal environment, the optimal approach would
395. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905), overruled in part by Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (discussing that the master over employee was held in high
esteem).
396. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937). Note, it is unlikely for
this change to occur at the federal level. When Lochner v. New York was decided, it signaled
a rapid decline in federal intervention in the economy. This was known as the Lochner Era.
See Barry Cushman, Teaching the Lochner Era, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 537 (2018) (noting that
as the Great Depression took its toll, the Supreme Court was more willing to intervene and
this demonstrated a growth employment protection. However, in modern day, the Supreme
Court has changed again and it is believed that another Lochner Era is quickly approaching);
see also Mark Joseph Stern, A New Lochner Era, SLATE (June 29, 2018, 4:01 PM), https://sl
ate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/the-lochner-era-is-set-for-a-comeback-at-the-supreme-c
ourt.html [https://perma.cc/6Z8Z-ELRM] (discussing the New Lochner Era).
397. Franchise Business Success Rate vs Non-Franchise Business, ACG RESOURCES,
(Apr. 7, 2020) https://www.acgresources.com/franchise-business-success-rate-vs-non-franch
ise-business/ [https://perma.cc/U3M2-9PEH]
Franchise businesses typically have a higher growth rate and more stability, but
there is less freedom and control in how the franchisee runs the business. The
opposite is true of non-franchise businesses, whereby they are more risky [sic]
(typically a lower growth rate) but they give the business owner more freedom
and control in how the business runs.
398. See Giles & Barkoff, supra note 242, at 165 (noting the misrepresentations that
plagued franchisees).
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include court adoption of a stronger, expanded implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. It invokes an already-existing legal doctrine that can
be applied to the franchise world with little disruption. It allows parties to
be protected from issues not specifically covered in the contract. Franchisees
and franchisors can take comfort in knowing that, if they are blindsided, they
can recover. By adopting a standard test for franchising good faith and fair
dealing, courts may be better able to delineate the boundaries of appropriate
conduct and provide a stronger deterrent to bad faith behavior.

